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REGULATING THE REGULATORS: LIMITATIONS





The activities of American corporations frequently contact numerous
states. For example, a corporation may conduct business and have share-
holders, employees, and creditors in many states. For this reason, more than
one state could be said to have an interest' in regulating the affairs of a
corporation. It has generally been agreed, however, that certain corporate
activities should be governed by one uniform set of rules, as opposed to mul-
tiple regulation by all interested states. Courts, therefore, have to select the
law of one of the interested states to govern corporate "internal affairs,"
those activities that require one uniform set of rules. Because a corporation
historically has been viewed in American law as the creation of the state of
incorporation, and because a corporation would therefore be certain what
law governed its internal affairs, American courts have normally applied the
law of the state of incorporation to questions pertaining to corporate "inter-
nal affairs." This has been referred to as the "internal affairs doctrine."
This doctrine was initially regarded as a limit upon a forum's jurisdiction;
the only courts deemed to have jurisdiction over a corporation were the
courts of the state of incorporation, the state in which the entity was cre-
ated.
2
The internal affairs doctrine is no longer regarded as a limit upon juris-
diction; it is now considered a choice of law rule. Some courts recently have
exhibited a tendency to reject this doctrine even as a choice of law rule if the
subject corporation has much more substantial contacts with the forum than
with the state of incorporation or if the subject matter is one which logically
permits the application of multiple regulatory schemes.
3
The vast majority of courts, however, continue to apply the law of the
state of incorporation to internal affairs, regardless of the level of contacts
the corporation has with the forum or the state of incorporation, since it is
* B.A., 1970, Denison University; J.D., 1974, U.C.L.A. Associated with Barovick,
Konecky, Braun, Schwartz & Kay, Beverly Hills, California. The author wishes to thank David
Gubman of the California Bar for his comments regarding this article and Veronica Burnett for
her extensive secretarial help.
1. The term state interest is generally used in this article to refer to the level of contacts
between the state and the corporation. Apologies to Brainerd Currie.
2. See Latty, Pseudo-Foreqn Corporattins, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 143 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
Latty]; Oldham, Caliornia Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations-Trampling Upon the Tramp?, 17
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 85, 92 n.34 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Oldham].
3. See generally Oldham, supra note 2, at 93-98.
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considered vital that a corporation know in advance what law governs its
internal affairs. No other corporate choice of law approach heretofore ad-
vanced provides the same degree of certainty to a corporation regarding
what law will govern its internal affairs as does the internal affairs doctrine.
The problem which results from this policy is that frequently corporations
are governed by the law of a state with which the corporation has had mini-
mal contacts. Corporations are able to avoid the corporate law of its com-
mercial domicile by incorporating or reincorporating elsewhere.
A number of states have recently adopted statutes, such as "pseudo-
foreign" corporation laws and tender offer rules, which purport to regulate
various activities of foreign corporations that have significant contacts with
the state. Many of these regulated activities could be considered questions
pertaining to corporate internal affairs. This article will discuss the wisdom
and constitutionality of these attempts by states to regulate various activities
of foreign corporations, as well as potential problems which could result
from such statutes. It will then be suggested that "pseudo-foreign" corpora-
tion laws offer a means by which certainty can be retained in corporate
choice of law while allowing the commercial domicile to regulate the inter-
nal affairs of corporations in more instances.
II. HISTORY OF REGULATION OF CORPORATIONS WITH MULTI-STATE
CONTACTS
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the corporate laws of
many states were quite restrictive.' For example, many such corporate laws
limited the amount of assets a corporation could own. Many significant cor-
porate transactions required the approval of all directors and shareholders.
States then began to modify their statutes and make them less restrictive. 5
(Such less restrictive corporate statutes have been termed "enabling" statutes
or "pro-management" statutes, depending upon one's point of view.) Profes-
sor Hurst noted that at the beginning of the twentieth century our attitude
toward economic regulation was laissez faire; a societal judgment was made
that corporations should be unfettered in their attempt to spur economic
growth. 6 The depression in the 1930's, the abuses by corporate management
after the second world war, and a prolonged period of prosperity have cata-
lyzed another change in attitude toward corporate regulation. Many com-
mentators now contend that state corporate laws should be made more
4. See generally J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORA-
TIONS 16-18 (1917); J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 13-57 (1970); N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
175 [1971); Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before /786, AM. HIST. REV. 449 (1903).
5. See generall Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Cary]; Cary, Summary ofArticle on Federalism and Corporate Law, 31
Bus. LAW. 105 (1976); Folk, Does State Corporation Law Have a Future?, 8 GA. ST. B. J. 311 (1972);
Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering for Big Business: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DE PAUL
L. REV. 915 (1972); Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 193 (1958); Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "En-
ahhng"?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965).
6. See HURST, supra note 4, at xii.
[Vol. 57:3
1980] REGULA4 TING THE REGULA TORS 347
restrictive.
7
One obstacle to a state's attempt to make its corporate law more restric-
tive has been the internal affairs doctrine. This doctrine has been applied in
Anglo-American courts so that the internal affairs8 of a corporation are gov-
erned by the law of the state of incorporation, regardless of the contacts, if
any, the corporation has with the state of incorporation. 9 What has fre-
quently occurred is that corporations have incorporated (or reincorporated)
in jurisdictions with the least restrictive corporate law then in existence.l° A
state is obviously, therefore, not encouraged to make its corporate law more
7. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
(1976); Cary, supra note 5; Folk, supra note 5; Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act-Invitation
to Irresponsibility, 50 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1955); Jennings, Federa/iration of Corporation Law. Part Way
or All the Way, 31 Bus. LAW. 991 (1976); Latty, Some General Observations on the New Busness
Corporation Law of New York, II BUFFALO L. REV. 591 (1962); Schwartz, Federal Charterig of
Corporations. An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
8. Internal affairs have been defined as follows: "A corporation's internal affairs are in-
volved whenever the issue concerns the relations inter se of the corporation, its stockholders,
directors, officers or agents." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 313, Com-
ment a at 347 (1971). North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 154, 20 A.
1039, 1040 (1885) suggested the following definition: "[wihere the act complained of affects the
complainant solely in his capacity as a member of the corporation, whether it be as stockholder,
director, president or other officer, and is the act of the corporation, whether acting in stock-
holders' meeting, or through its agents, the board of directors, then such action is the manage-
ment of the internal affairs of the corporation .... "
Examples of corporate internal affairs include the rules pertaining to when dividends may
be declared, the duties and liabilities of officers and directors, the standards for indemnification
of directors and officers, the proper procedure for electing directors, and the standards for the
level of approval required for mergers and other types of reorganizations. The exact scope of
what constitutes a question pertaining to an internal affair of a corporation is somewhat impre-
cise; a court wishing to apply local law to a question involving a foreign corporation may find
that the issue does not pertain to the internal affairs of the corporation. See, e.g., Toklan Roy-
alty Corp. v. Tiffany, 193 Okla. 120, 141 P.2d 571 (1943).
Matters which clearly do not constitute corporate internal affairs include matters relating
to the execution of contracts by a corporation, the commission of torts by a corporation or its
agents, and the conveyance of property. See general y Baraf, The Foreign Corporation--A Problem in
Choice of Law Doctrine, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 219, 235 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Barafl; Reese
& Kaufman, The Law Governig Corporate Afairs. Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and
Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1124 (1958).
9. No distinction is generally made between a foreign corporation with substantial con-
tacts with its state of incorporation and a foreign corporation which has almost all of its contacts
with the forum. The law of the state of incorporation traditionally has been applied to all
foreign corporations. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Amsterdam Improvement Co., 140 N.Y. 576, 35
N.E. 964 (1894); Demarest v. Grant, 128 N.Y. 205, 28 N.E. 645 (1891); Nicholson v. Franklin
Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94, 91 N.E. 991 (1910); Cochran v. Shetler, 286 Pa. 226, 133 A. 232
(1926); see generally Latty, supra note 5, at 145-48.
10. Charles A. Beard made these findings regarding attempts by New Jersey to make its
corporations code more restrictive:
Under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson, after he was challenged by Theodore
Roosevelt to reform his own state, the legislature of New Jersey passed a series of laws
doing away with corporate abuses and applying high standards to corporations. What
was the result? The revenues of the state from taxes on corporations fell. Malefactors
moved over into other states. In time the New Jersey legislature repealed its strict and
prudent legislation, and went back, not quite, but almost to old ways ....
Hearings on S. 10 before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judicia, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 326
(1937).
Similar frustration is reflected in this portion of the report of the Corporation Law Revision
Commission of New Jersey:
It is clear that the major protections to investors, creditors, employees, customers, and
the general public have come, and must continue to come, from federal legislation and
not from state corporation acts . . . any attempt to provide such regulations in the
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
restrictive; domestic corporations may then reincorporate out of the state
and new corporations will become incorporated in another state rather than
being formed in the state. States will thereby lose charter fees" and lose any
power to regulate the internal affairs of such corporations. Most states have
attempted to make their corporation laws approximately as enabling as the
least restrictive state law then extant; if one state has adopted a new type of
enabling provision or amended the corporation code in some way to make it
less restrictive, other states commonly follow suit.1 2 This trend during the
twentieth century toward decreasingly restrictive corporate law has been
termed the "Gresham's law" of corporate law.
13
California and New York have attempted to rectify the more extreme
abuses of state corporate law shopping (and stem the "Greshman's law" of
corporation codes) by enacting laws which purport to regulate the internal
affairs of technically foreign corporations whose "commercial domicile" or
"social seat" is located in California or New York, respectively.' 4 These stat-
utes address a significant problem in contemporary corporate choice of
law-the regulation of a corporation with minimal contacts with the state of
incorporation and a majority of its contacts with another state.
III. LAW GOVERNING CORPORATIONS WITH MULTI-STATE CONTACTS
A. General Choice of Law Rules
California and New York have adopted statutes which expressly require
the application of certain sections of the law of the forum to the activities of
foreign corporations which have a certain level of contacts with the state.' 5
Absent such a statute, courts generally apply the law of the state of incorpo-
ration to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, even if the corporation
had substantial contacts with the forum and minimal contacts with the state
public interest through state incorporation acts and similar legislation would only
drive corporations out of the state to more hospitable jurisdictions.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14a (West 1969) (Report of the Corporation Law Revision Commission, at
XI). See generally Schwartz, A Casefor Federal Charterng of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Schwartz]; Schwartz, supra note 7; Comment, Lawfor Sale: A Study of the
Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969).
11. The importance of charter fees to states such as Delaware is discussed in Oldham, supra
note 2, at 105 n.78.
12. See Oldham, Book Review, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 335, 338 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Oldham, Book Review].
13. Gresham's law has been generalized to stand for any situation where the cheap drives
out the valuable or the good. See Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND.
L. REV. 433, 437 (1968); see generally Oldham, supra note 2, at 104-110. Another term used to
describe this trend has been corporate "charter mongering." See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1977,
at 14, col. 6 (remarks by Professor Neil Jacoby).
For a general discussion of examples of Gresham's law of state corporations codes, see Cary,
supra note 5; Schwartz, supra note 10. Examples of the increasingly "enabling" and pro-man-
agement profile of state corporate law can be seen both in the chronology of the enactment of
state law provisions sanctioning broader indemnification rights of corporate insiders (see Old-
ham, supra note 2, at 108) and the enactment of state takeover laws. In both instances, a few
states adopted such laws and then a number of other states quickly adopted similar provisions.
14. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW §§ 1315-1320 (Mc-
Kinney 1968).
15. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 1315-1320 (Mc-
Kinney 1968).
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of incorporation. 6 If, however, the law of the state of incorporation conflicts
with an important policy of the state,' 7 or if the foreign corporation con-
ducts all or almost all of its business in the forum, 8 a court might apply the
law of the forum.
The internal affairs doctrine is a legacy of the "vested rights" approach
to choice of law questions.' 9 This approach geographically conceptualizes
the rights of parties resulting from a transaction or occurrence with multi-
state contacts. The rights of parties are said to "vest" in the place where
they are "created"; the law of the vesting state must then be applied to gov-
ern those rights, regardless of where an action upon them is brought.
20
Under the vested rights approach, the general nature of the action is first
"characterized" (as a torts or contract action, for example). 2 1 A choice of
16. See generally Latty, supra note 2, at 145-48.
17. See, e.g., Paper Products Co. v. Doggrell, 195 Tenn. 581, 261 S.W.2d 127, 129 (1953).
Pursuant to the vested rights approach to the choice of law questions, a court might not apply
the law of the state of incorporation if that law is deemed to violate a "fundamental policy" of
the forum. See, e.g., Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1962). See generally Nussbaum,
Public Policy and Political Crtsis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027, 1031 (1940); Paulsen &
Sovern, "ublic Polig" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 981 (1956).
18. See, e.g., Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959)
(applied Louisiana law to determine the duty of insiders of a Delaware corporation where the
corporation transacted almost all of its business in Louisiana); Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139
(10th Cir. 1952) (applied Kansas law to determine the duty owed by an officer of an Illinois
corporation which did substantially all of its business in Kansas); International Ticket Scale
Corp. v. United States, 165 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1948) (applied the law of New York to the ques-
tion of legality of a dividend by a Delaware corporation); State v. Iowa S. Util. Co., 231 Iowa
784, 2 N.W.2d 372 (1942), affdsub nom. State v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948),
cert. denied sub nom. Bechtel v. Thatcher, 337 U.S. 918 (1949) (applied Iowa law to govern the
recapitalization of a Delaware corporation which did substantially all of its business in Iowa);
German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915) (applied New York
law to the legality of a dividend to be paid by a New Jersey corporation whose principal place
of business was New York); McQuade v. Stoneham, 230 App. Div. 57, 242 N.Y.S. 548 (1930),
rev'd on othergrounds, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934) (New York law was applied to a question
regarding the removal of an officer of a New Jersey corporation whose principal place of busi-
ness was New York).
These cases sometime refer to "equal treatment" legislation enacted by the various states as
an additional reason for the application of forum law. Such equal treatment statutes generally
provide that foreign and domestic corporations shall be treated equally and that foreign corpo-
rations shall bear the same burdens and responsibilities as domestic corporations. See, e.g., TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.02 (Vernon 1968). If taken literally, it could be argued that these
provisions require foreign corporations to be governed by local corporation law. See Latty,
Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 157 (1955). See generally Coleman, Corporate Dii-
dends and the Conflict ofLaws, 63 HARV. L. REV. 433, 444 (1950); Kaplan, supra note 13, at 470-
71. Such equal treatment statutes have rarely been construed by courts.
In some cases involving local creditors of foreign corporations, courts have held that certain
creditor protection provisions contained in the local corporations code (such as the liability of
shareholders for certain types of corporate debts) applied to all foreign corporations licensed to
do business in the state. See, e.g., Joncas v. Krueger, 61 Wis.2d 529, 213 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
19. See generaly Note, Forum Non Conveniens as a Substitute for the Internal Affais Rule, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 234 (1958); Note, The Development ofthe "Internal Affairs" Rule in the Federal Courts
and Its Future Under Erie v. Thompkins, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 413 (1946); Note, The "Internal
Affairs" Doctrine in State Courts, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 666 (1949).
20. See, e.g., Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527, 203
N.E.2d 210 (1964); H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 11, 14 (4th ed. 1964).
21. Characterization consists of classifying a matter within one of the established categories
of cases. See A. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1940); Cook,
"Charactertzation"in the Conflict ofLaws, 51 YALE L.J. 191 (1941); Morse, Characterization: Shadow
or Substance, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1027 (1949).
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law rule (connecting factor) has evolved for each general type of action; all
choice of law questions of the same type are treated similarly. Once the
action is characterized, the application of the appropriate connecting factor
leads to the state where the rights of the parties vest, and the laws of that
state govern substantive questions presented by the action. For example, all
tort questions are said to be governed by the law of the state where the al-
leged wrong occurred. Similarly, questions concerning the internal affairs of
a corporation have traditionally been decided by reference to the corporate
code of the state of incorporation, since the rights and duties regarding such
affairs were said to vest there.
Because the law selected pursuant to the vested rights approach fre-
quently is that of a state with little or no interest in regulating the parties or
transaction involved, recent choice of law decisions in many subject areas
have exhibited a growing dissatisfaction with the vested rights approach; a
number of courts now consider the various state policies underlying the laws
of the states with contacts with the matter2 2 or the contacts between the
parties involved and the various states.23 These governmental interest anal-
yses and Second Restatement approaches have generally not been applied to
questions pertaining to the internal affairs of corporations, however. Courts
have generally continued to apply the internal affairs doctrine. 24 This is
because there is general agreement that a corporation must be certain what
corporate law governs its internal affairs.
The internal affairs doctrine provides this desired certainty. If the gov-
erning corporate law was determined on an ad hoc basis based upon which
state had the most significant contacts with the corporation or upon which
state's policy would be advanced by the application of its law in each situa-
tion, corporations would not be sure which law governed their behavior,
thereby severely burdening commerce. The question addressed by this arti-
cle is whether certainty in corporate choice of law could be maintained while
attempting to insure that the state with the most significant contacts with a
corporation could regulate it.
B. Statutory Choice of Law Rules
It was mentioned above that California and New York have adopted
certain choice of law rules regarding the application of local law to foreign
corporations with certain contacts with the state. California's law provides
that its law shall apply to such corporations "to the exclusion of the law of
the state of incorporation."' 25 In contrast, other states have statutorily en-
acted the internal affairs doctrine. For example, Delaware's corporations
22. This is referred to as governmental interest analysis. See, e.g., Mazza v. Mazza, 475
F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967); Horowitz, The
Law of Choice of Law in Californa-A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 719 (1974); Milhollin, The
Newr Choice of Laew in the District of Columbia, 24 CATH. L. REV. 448 (1975).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, at 10 (1971).
24. Some courts have expressly or impliedly not followed the internal affairs doctrine in
some situations. See cases cited at note 18 supra. For a discussion of these cases, see Oldham,
supra note 2, at 93-98.
25. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a) (West 1977).
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code provides that its law shall govern the internal affairs of all Delaware
corporations.
26
Such statutes normally must be adhered to by local courts, unless the
enforcement of such a statute would be unconstitutional. 27 Of course, such
choice of law statutes are not binding on foreign courts; they would apply
normal conflict of laws rules.
IV. FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW
Although Congress has enacted securities laws which regulate the issu-
ance and trading of securities and the dissemination of information by cor-
porations, the internal affairs of American corporations are generally
regulated by state corporate law.2 8 It has been suggested that, regarding
large, truly national corporations, it seems somewhat absurd from a policy
standpoint that such corporations would be governed by the corporate law
of the state where the charter documents are filed rather than a federal cor-
poration law.29 Such an argument is persuasive from a policy standpoint;
however, there are competing considerations.
State corporate law-has a rich body of precedent and most statutory
sections of the corporate law of commercial states (such as Delaware, New
York and California) have been construed in numerous court decisions; the
meaning of such statutes is now relatively clear. A new federal corporation
law would obviously be a composite of state corporate law. The statutory
sections probably would not be enacted by Congress in a form identical to a
state code section; it is likely that Congress would revise the section in some
manner or combine two or more sections. The result would be, at least in
the short run, that the meaning of such sections would be unclear. The obvi-
ous counter-argument is that in a short period of time (after such sections
had been construed by courts) they too would then be clear in their mean-
ing.
A more fundamental reason exists for not enacting a federal corporation
law. It is submitted that there is no necessity for federal pre-emption of cor-
porate law applicable to national corporations. Concern relating to state
corporate law abuse generally focuses upon relatively few statutory sec-
tions.30 Such concerns could be addressed in a federal act which would ad-
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 121(b) (1975).
27. See generally Halloran & Hammer, Section 2115 ofthe New California General Corporation
Law--The Application of California Corporation Law to Foreign Corporations, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1282, 1289, n.18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Halloran & Hammer]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971).
28. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Certain stock exchanges also
regulate certain internal affairs matters of companies with shares listed on the exchange.
29. See generally R. NADER, supra note 7; Henning, Federal Corporate Charters for Big Busiess:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915 (1972); Schwartz, supra note 7;
Schwartz, supra note 10; Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations. A Proposal, 61 GEO. L. J. 89
(1972).
30. See generally Cary, supra note 5. For example, reform proposals generally propose that
corporate management (i) should be required to satisfy a higher standard of care and (ii) should
not be indemnified by the corporation or company insurance in a larger number of instances.
Other reforms proposed pertain to requiring more disclosure by large corporations and permit-
ting a "public" representative to sit on the board of directors of large corporations. Ways to
19801
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dress only these primary concerns. State corporate law not in conflict with
these sections could continue to apply to such national corporations. 3' Na-
tional corporations could continue to avail themselves of the relative cer-
tainty now existing in state corporate law, and federal policy could be
furthered by the enactment of any statutes deemed to reflect an important
federal policy.
32
Another practical concern militates against any proposal for a federal
corporation law. As the drafters of California's new general corporation law
recently discovered, drafting a corporate code is a terrifically difficult and
complex task. Rather than require congressmen and their staffs to become
mired in the technicalities of corporate law drafting, it would seem prefera-
ble to focus their attention and energy upon the relatively small number of
issues which are cause for public concern.
Although for a short period of time it appeared that the adoption of
some sort of a federal corporation law was a political possibility,33 it now
appears that there are few members of Congress who actively support such a
proposal. For this reason, even a proposed federal minimum standards act is
probably not a realistic proposal at the present time. Because of this, and
because the Supreme Court has recently narrowly construed the federal se-
curities law, 34 it appears clear that in the near future corporate internal af-
fairs matters will be governed by state corporation law.
increase the independence of the company's auditors and board of directors from company
management have also been suggested. Means of facilitating public disclosure of questionable
corporate behavior have also been advanced, such as attempting to protect employees that
"blow the whistle" regarding a problem of the corporation and creating an office of corporate
ombudsman. See generally Oldham, Book Review, supra note 12.
It has also been suggested, however, that state court judges tend to be more pro-manage-
ment than federal court judges. Gary, supra note 5. Creating a federal corporation law would
result in disputes being adjudicated in federal court rather than state court.
31. Proponents of federal chartering criticize such a plan, since they believe state legislators
would attempt to undermine the federal law. See, e.g., Henning, Federalism and Corporate Law:
The Chaos Inherent in the Cary Proposal, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 362 (1976).
32. See Cary, supra note 5; Folk, State Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of Responsible
Management Conduct, 31 Bus. LAW. 1031, 1080 (1976); Hurst, Remarks, 31 Bus. LAW. 1185, 1191
(1976); Loss, Wrap Up, 31 Bus. LAW. 1193, 1199 (1976); Henning, supra note 31: Schwartz, supra
note 10. But see Aranson, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Idea Well Worth Forgetting, Bus. &
Soc'Y REV./INNOVATION 59 (Winter 1973-74); Arsht, Reply to Professor Cagr, 31 Bus. LAW. 1131
(1976); Drexler, Federalism and Corporate Law: A Misguided Missile, 3 SEc. REG. L.J. 374 (1976).
See generally Oldham, Book Review, supra note 12.
33. For example, the 1972 Democratic Party platform proposed the establishment of a
commission to study federal chartering of large corporations. See 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
1728 (1972). Although federal chartering has been proposed sporadically during this century
(see, e.g., Brabner-Smith, Federal Incorporation of Business, 24 VA. L. REV. 159 (1937); Snapp,
National Incorporation, 5 ILL. L. REV. 414 (1911)), the idea received a great deal of attention in
the early 1970's. See generally R. Nader, supra note 7; Henning, supra note 5; Jennings, supra note
7; Note, Federal Chartering ofCorporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89 (1972).
34. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (a plaintiff in an
action pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must have "purchased"
or "sold" a security); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (an action for damages
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act must establish "scienter"-and intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud-on the part of the defendant); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (4 breach of fiduciary duty, absent any deception, misrepresentation
or nondisclosure, does not establish a cause of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act).
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The "Gresham's law" effect which the internal affairs doctrine has had
upon state corporation law has been outlined above. This pro-management
drift in state corporate law has resulted because the law of the state of incor-
poration has generally been applied to a corporation's internal affairs, re-
gardless of the contacts the corporation has with the various interested states.
States have perceived that their corporate law should not be made too re-
strictive or the corporation would reincorporate elsewhere.
This "Gresham's law" effect could be reduced if states would adopt
pseudo-foreign corporation statutes, which provide that important sections
of the state corporate law would govern corporations whose commercial
domicile was clearly in the state even though the charter documents were
filed elsewhere. This would give states additional power to regulate corpora-
tions commercially domiciled there, thereby diminishing the need for a fed-
eral corporation law.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS: STATE REGULATION OF CORPORATIONS
WITH MULTI-STATE CONTACTS
No one contends that the corporate law of a state other than the state of
incorporation should apply to a corporation whose principal contacts are
with the state of incorporation (such a corporation will be referred to herein
as a "domestic" corporation). The matter is less clear regarding corporations
with less substantial contacts with the state of incorporation. For example,
commentators frequently advocate that the law of the state of incorporation
should not apply to a corporation which has approximately eighty percent
or more of its contacts with a foreign state (such a corporation will be re-
ferred to herein as a "technically foreign" corporation).3 5 A number of com-
mentators also advocate the application of foreign corporate law to a
corporation with fifty to eighty percent of their contacts with a state other
than the state of its incorporation (such a corporation will be referred to
herein as an "arguably foreign" corporation). 36 Corporations which do not
have fifty percent of their contacts with any one state will be referred to
herein as "national" corporations.
The application of the law other than the state of incorporation to tech-
nically foreign and arguably foreign corporations raises certain constitu-
tional questions. One could argue that this would violate the due process
clause or the full faith and credit clause, or that, because a corporation will
not be certain what law governs its internal affairs, an impermissible burden
35. See Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27, at 1329; Horowitz, supra note 22, at 819-20;
Leflar, Constiutional Ltmils on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 706, 715 n.45
(1963). The Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws expresses no opinion regarding the
law applicable to foreign corporations with substantially all of their contacts with another state.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302, Comment g (1971).
Former Chief Justice Roger Traynor has stated that "courts have a creative job to do when
they find that a rule has lost its touch with reality and should be abandoned or reformulated to
meet conditions and new moral values." Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Socity,
1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230, 232. It is submitted that applying the internal affairs doctrine to techni-
cally foreign corporations in some situations is a rule which has "lost its touch with reality."
36. See generally Baraf, supra note 8.
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on interstate commerce would result. These constitutional questions will be
addressed below.
A. Due Process Clause
Early Supreme Court cases, discussing the limitations imposed by the
Constitution upon choice of law decisions, suggested that the due process
clause 3 7 required the application of the vested rights choice of law ap-
proach. 38 Later cases made it clear that it is constitutionally permissible
under the due process clause for a state to apply the law of any state that has
a reasonable connection with the matters in controversy. 39 Recent Supreme
Court cases hold that the due process clause only proscribes a state from
applying its law to a matter in which it has no signficant contacts.
40
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... "
38. See, e.g., Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143
(1934); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
39. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Watson v. Employers Liab.
Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943);
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
40. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S.
397 (1930); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Reese & Kaufman, supra note 8,
at 1129.
In Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962) the Supreme Court stated that:
Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in
question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the States involved,
could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another state
having such an interest in the multi-state activity.
Similarly, Clay sanctioned the application of forum law, emphasizing that the forum had "am-
ple contacts with the present transaction." 377 U.S. at 183.
In some instances the application of forum law has been deemed a violation of due process
even though the state had a significant contact with the parties or the transaction involved. See
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924). In these cases, the contacts between the
state and the transaction occurred late in the chronology of the transaction, and it has been
considered unfair to the party resisting the application of the forum law to apply the forum law.
One commentator noted that these cases stand for the rule that, if the contact between the state
and the transaction was "so late in the history of the transaction in dispute that to apply its law
would result in a serious disregard of the justifiable expectations of one of the parties," due
process forbids the application of forum law. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Lbmiations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IOWA L. REV. 449, 457 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Weintraub]. Similarly, Professor Kirgis contends that these cases stand for the rule that forum
law may not be applied if it would be "manifestly unfair to the party resisting it." See Kirgis,
The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94, 103
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Kirgis]. This due process limit upon state choice of law would not
affect the regulation of corporations with multi-state contacts.
Professor Weintraub has suggested that these cases stand for the rule that:
it is a violation of due process for a forum having no substantial connection with the
parties or the facts to affect the result . . . through the device of 'procedural' charac-
terization if application of the forum rule will serve no significant local policy and if
application of the foreign rule will not involve scrutiny of the intricacies of foreign
procedure.
44 IOWA L. REV. at 490. This aspect of the due process limit upon state choice of law could
affect multi-state regulation of corporations. Some courts attempt to circumvent the internal
affairs doctrine by deeming an issue a matter of "procedure" or for some other reason not one
pertaining to the internal affairs of a corporation. See Oldham, supra note 2, at 93-98. Often,
the matter could not seriously be characterized as procedural and its characterization as such is
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The Court's more flexible approach to choice of law decisions is re-
flected in Watson o. Employers Liabith Assurance Corp. 4' The plaintiff, a resi-
dent of the forum, brought an action against the insurer of the manufacturer
of a product which had injured her. A clause in the insurance policy barred
a direct action by the injured party against the insurance company. This
clause was valid under Massachusetts law, the state where the insurance con-
tract was executed, and the law of Illinois, the principal place of business of
the manufacturer, but invalid under the law of the forum. The forum ap-
plied its law and held the clause to be invalid. The insurer argued that this
violated due process. The Supreme Court deemed this choice of law deter-
mination constitutional since "more states than one may seize hold of local
activities which are part of multi-state transactions and may regulate to pro-
tect interests of its own people."'42 The Court noted that the forum had an
interest in protecting its injured residents.
Clay v. Sun Insurance Oftce, Lid 43 evidences a similar approach. In Clay,
a forum resident brought suit against a foreign insurance company under a
policy which the plaintiff had purchased when he resided in another state. A
provision in the policy limited the period (after an insured loss) during
which actions under the policy could be brought. This limitation was valid
in the state where the contract was executed but invalid under the law of the
forum. The forum applied its law. The Supreme Court held that this was
constitutional, since the forum had "ample contacts with the transaction.
4 4
The discussion above shows that the application of the corporate law of
the state of commercial domicile45 would not violate the due process clause,
since the state of commercial domicile would have significant contacts with
the corporation.
It is unclear what actually constitutes sufficient contacts to justify the
application of the forum's law under the due process clause. 46 Arguably for-
generally a fairly obvious means of circumventing normal choice of law results. Such matters,
however, frequently involve situations in which the forum has a substantial connection with the
parties or the transaction or a local interest will be served by applying forum law. These cases,
therefore, probably do not violate due process, at least according to the Weintraub formulation
of its requirements.
41. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
42. d at 72.
43. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
44. Id. at 183.
45. The term "commercial domicile" will be used herein as a shorthand reference to the
state with which a corporation has a majority of its contacts. It is not suggested that the concept
of "domicile" is otherwise useful in discussing corporate choice of law. See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11, Comment 1 (197 1).
46. It apparently does not constitute a sufficient contact if one of the parties to an action is
a nonresident domiciliary of the forum. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
One thing which confuses due process analysis is the cavalier way in which courts inter-
changeably employ the terms "contact" and "state interest." These obviously are two different
concepts-a contact refers to a connection with the transaction, while an interest refers to the
fact that a state policy will be advanced by the application of its law to the transaction. Certain
due process cases repeatedly refer to the fact that due process requires a state to have an interest
in the application of its law. See, e.g., Aldens Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976). Most cases and commentators agree, however, that the appropriate
test for due process should be phrased in terms of "contacts" rather than an interest. See gener-
ally Weintraub, supra note 40, at 490.
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eign and technically foreign corporations frequently have minimal contacts
with the state of incorporation. The most significant contact may be an
agent for service of process and a post office box. Such corporations may
have no employees, do no business, and have no stockholders which reside in
the state of incorporation; if so, it may be a violation of the due process
clause to apply the law of the state of incorporation to such corporations.
47
It has been suggested that the state tender offer laws may, to the extent
that they purport to govern offers made by an out-of-state offeror to share-
holders residing outside the state, violate due process. 48 The regulating state
obviously has no contact between the out-of-state offer made to the non-
resident shareholder. As a result of the contacts between the corporation
and the state, however, the state might have sufficient contacts with the cor-
poration to render constitutional its regulation of activities affecting the cor-
poration which occur outside the state. Such a determination would be best
made under the full faith and credit standard set forth below. 49 It would
appear that, unless the extraterritorial application of state tender offer laws
would be required by the full faith and credit standard, an attempt by a
state to regulate tender offers made outside the state to non-resident share-
holders of foreign corporations should be deemed to violate due process.
B. Full Faith and Credit Clause
The full faith and credit clause provides that a state must give full faith
and credit to the "public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every
other State."'5  Although the phrase "public Acts, Records and judicial Pro-
ceedings" has been construed to include statutes5 as well as judicial deci-
sions, 52 the Supreme Court has rarely held that full faith and credit requires
the application of the law of one state in the courts of another, and the Court
has become increasingly reluctant to so hold. Supreme Court cases have
held choice of law determinations violative of full faith and credit in three
subject areas: workmen's compensation laws, shareholder assessments, and
fraternal benefit insurance associations.
53
47. One reason for the requirement that a state have some contact with the matter in
dispute is so that the parties are not unfairly surprised by the application of the law of a state
with no connection with the traisaction. Since it could hardly be said that the application of
the law of the state of incorporation would result in unfair surprise, this suggests that a court
would not deem this a violation of due process.
48. Set Note, Securities Law and the Constitution.- State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88
YALE L.J. 510, 528 (1979).
49. See notes 101-19 and accompanying text infra.
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."
51. See, e.g., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
52. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
53. In addition to these three subject areas, the Supreme Court has sometimes held that it
is a violation of the full faith and credit clause for a state to refuse to provide a forum for a suit
based upon a foreign wrongful death statute. See First Nat'l Bank v.. United Airlines, Inc., 342
U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
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1. Workmen's Compensation
The Supreme Court held that full faith and credit required the applica-
tion of the workmen's compensation act of the state where the employment
contract was entered into if the law of that state attempted to provide an
exclusive remedy.54 The Court has since retreated from this approach and
has more recently ruled, in a number of cases, that even if the employment
contract was executed outside the forum, it is constitutionally permissible for
the forum to apply its law if the forum had a substantial interest in the
transaction.
55
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 56 Pacf Employers Insurance Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm'n, 57 and Carroll v. Lanza58 considered full faith and
credit limitations upon choice of law in workmen's compensation cases. In
Clapper, the employee normally worked and resided in Vermont. He was
sent on a short assignment to New Hampshire where he was killed in an
accident; the employee had no contacts with New Hampshire, other than his
brief work assignment. 59 Suit was brought in New Hampshire, and New
Hampshire applied its law. The Supreme Court decided that this was a
denial of full faith and credit to the law of Vermont.
In Pacific Employers, a resident of Massachusetts, who customarily
worked in Massachusetts, was temporarily transferred to California. After
being in California for a short time, the employee was injured. The em-
ployee was treated in California and incurred medical bills from California
doctors. Suit was later brought in California regarding the injury and the
California court applied California's workmen's compensation law and not
the law of Massachusetts. The Supreme Court held that this application of
California law did not violate the full faith and credit clause. Since the em-
ployee had been working in California a significant period of time, and since
there were California creditors of the employee, California had a significant
interest in applying its law.
60
Carroll involved an injury to an employee who normally resided and
worked in Missouri. The employee was sent to Arkansas to do some work
and was injured during the course of that work. Mr. Carroll was taken to a
hospital in Missouri; presumably there were no medical creditors in Arkan-
sas (other than possibly for ambulance service). Mr. Carroll had been ac-
tively involved in the Arkansas project for at least two months prior to the
date of injury.6 1 Carroll later filed suit in Arkansas court regarding his in-
jury and the court applied Arkansas law and not the workmen's compensa-
54. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
55. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
294 U.S. 532 (1935). See generally Kirgis, supra note 40, at 95-110.
56. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
57. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
58. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
59. The facts of this case are more fully set forth in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 51
F.2d 992 (1st Cir. 1931).
60. See generaly Kirgis, supra note 40, at 113.
61. 116 F. Supp. 491, 494-99 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
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tion law of Missouri. The Supreme Court determined that the application
of Arkansas law did not violate the full faith and credit clause, since Arkan-
sas had "a legitimate interest" in regulating the matter.6 2 The Court stated
that "[t]he State where the tort occurs certainly has a concern in the
problems following in the wake of the injury. The problems of medical care
and of possible dependants are among these, as . . .[Paciftc Employers] em-
phasizes."
'63
Two commentators have made two different attempts to reconcile Clap-
per, Pacift Employers and Carroll. Professor Weintraub suggests that Carroll
and Pacific Employers substantially limited Clapper and possibly overruled it
sub silentio. 64 Professor Kirgis argues that the cases are reconcilable. He
contends that in Clapper the state of injury had minimal interest in applying
its law to compensate wrongful death victims, since the injured employee left
no dependants and did not reside in the state.65 Kirgis claims that in Pacqic
Employers and Carroll the state of injury had a greater interest in the applica-
tion of its law. In Pactfc Employers, the injured employee incurred medical
bills and apparently resided in California, while Mr. Clapper did not reside
in New Hampshire and apparently did not receive any medical care there.
66
Similarly, Kirgis argues that in Carroll the injured employee had resided in
Arkansas and generally had more substantial contacts there than Mr. Clap-
per had with New Hampshire.
67
Regardless of whether Clapper is viewed as being essentially overruled
by Carroll and Pacir Employers or whether Clapper is still considered to re-
quire that a forum must have some interest in regulating a transaction
before it may apply its law to the transaction, no full faith and credit prob-
lem would result from the application of the law of the commercial domicile
of a technically foreign or arguably foreign corporation to its internal affairs,
since that state would clearly have such an interest.
2. Shareholder Assessments
Three Supreme Court cases involving shareholder assessments are more
difficult to reconcile. Broderick v. Rosner68 involved a bank which was incor-
porated in New York, and which had all of its business offices located in New
York. A majority of its depositors, creditors, and stockholders probably were
residents of New York; only 557 of the over 20,000 bank shareholders lived in
New Jersey.69 New York law at that time permitted a corporation's share-
holders to be subject to assessment. An administrative determination was
62. See 349 U.S. at 413.
63. Id.
64. See Weintraub, supra note 40, at 471-73. The Court in Carroll stated that Pacfic Employ-
ers "departed from" (meaning that it severely limited) Clapper.
65. See Kirgis, supra note 40, at 213. Professor Kirgis does not discuss the fact that Mr.
Clapper was killed in New Hampshire and that certain expenses could have resulted therefrom,
such as ambulance or mortician fees. See generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Covernmental Interests and heJudicial Functions, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 26-27 (1958).
66. See Kirgis, supra note 40, at 123.
67. Id. at 124.
68. 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
69. Id. at 638, 640.
[Vol. 57:3
REGULA TING THE REGULA TORS
made in New York that the corporation's shareholders were subject to assess-
ment. New Jersey had enacted a law which barred suits based on foreign
assessment statutes, and pursuant to that law, a New Jersey court refused to
hear a suit based on the New York assessment determination. The Supreme
Court held that full faith and credit required the New Jersey court to allow
the suit.
70
Broderzck could be explained on the basis that in personam jurisdiction
existed over the New Jersey resident in the New York proceeding due to the
shareholder's relationship to the corporation (an implied consent notion),
and that full faith and credit should be given to the New York administra-
tive determination. It also could be argued that the case stands for the
broad rule that full faith and credit requires the application of the law of the
state of incorporation to questions pertaining to the internal affairs of a cor-
poration (or at least shareholder assessments). A third interpretation is that
this represents a situation in which New Jersey had a minimal interest in the
application of its law and New York had an overwhelming interest in the
application of its law. The language of the Broderick decision is unclear
which is the correct interpretation. The Court ruled that the matter was so
"peculiarly within the regulatory power of . . . the State of incorporation
• . . that no other State properly can be said to have any public policy
thereon."
71
The full faith and credit clause might require, as some suggest, 72 the
application of the law of one state where it is clear that uniform national
regulation of an issue is required. Accordingly, Broderick could stand for the
proposition that questions pertaining to shareholder assessments require uni-
form national regulation and, therefore, the application of the law of the
state of incorporation.
The Supreme Court decided in Pinney v. Nelson 73 and Thomas v. Malthtes-
sen 74 that a court may apply local law which sanctions assessment of share-
holders of foreign corporations, although the law of the state of
incorporation proscribes such an assessment. These cases both involved suits
in California by California creditors against shareholders of foreign corpora-
tions, both of whose charters expressly authorized the corporation to do busi-
ness in California. The Court reasoned that since the charters of both
corporations expressly referred to the corporation doing business in Califor-
nia, the shareholders had somehow contracted to follow California corporate
law. 75 Although the corporations were incorporated elsewhere and con-
ducted a significant amount of business outside of California, this was not
mentioned by the Court. It is unclear whether Pinney and Thomas are lim-
ited to situations in which a corporation expressly refers in its charter to
doing business in states other than the state of incorporation.
It is difficult to reconcile Broderik with Thomas and Pznney. Unless Brod-
70. Accord, Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912).
71. 294 U.S. at 643 (quoting Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 260 (1912)).
72. See generaly Kirgis, supra note 40, at 120; Weintraub, supra note 40, at 455.
73. 183 U.S. 144 (1901).
74. 232 U.S. 221 (1914).
75. 183 U.S. at 151; 232 U.S. at 234-35.
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erick inferentially overruled Thomas and Pinney, or unless Pney and Thomas
are limited to situations where the charter expressly authorizes corporate
business outside the state of incorporation, it appears that Broderick must be
limited to its facts. Professor Currie has suggested that Broderick resulted
from New York's clear interest in the application of its law to protect credi-
tors of New York banks, while New Jersey had no legitimate interest in the
application of its law. 7 6 Another commentator has argued that BroderIck
holds "that a state may not deny recovery on foreign facts when its own
domestic law would award recovery on parallel facts occurring within its
own borders." 77 Professor Currie has asserted that Broderick's teaching is
that if one state has a substantial interest in the application of its law and the
forum has no legitimate interest in the application of its law, the full faith
and credit clause requires the application of the former state's law. 78 Profes-
sor Baraf, however, has maintained that the implication of Broderzck, Thomas,
and Pnney is that a state can regulate-consistently with full faith and
credit-the internal affairs of a foreign corporation with which the state has
a substantial connection.
79
The application of the law of a state other than the state of incorpora-
tion to a question pertaining to the internal affairs of an arguably foreign or
technically foreign corporation would not violate the rule of Broderck,
Thomas, and Pinney as set forth in the preceding paragraph. The law of that
state could be applied to a foreign corporation with substantial contacts with
the forum, since the forum would have a legitimate interest in the applica-
tion of its law.
3. Fraternal Benefit Insurance Associations
Certain cases involving fraternal benefit insurance associations have
held that the law of the state where an organization was formed must be
applied to questions regarding the organization.8 ° One commentator has
argued that these cases stand for the proposition that where uniform na-
tional regulation is needed, full faith and credit requires the application of
the law of a certain state.8 ' The question which obviously arises is whether
the rationale of these cases would extend to the internal affairs doctrine.
While not clear, it is generally thought that the reasoning of these cases
would not extend to the internal affairs doctrine.82 In any event, these cases
76. See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 347 (1963).
77. Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System, 20 MINN. L. REV. 140, 178 (1936). See
generaly Hilpert & Cooley, The Federal Constitution and he Choice of Law, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 27, 35-
36 (1939); Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Pub/ic Poicy, 19 U. CHI. L. REV.
339, 342-43 (1952).
78. See Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause ofActon, 73 HARV. L. REV. 268,
290 (1959).
79. See Baraf, supra note 8, at 245-47.
80. See Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947);
Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Supreme Council of the Royal
Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
81. See Weintraub, supra note 40, at 478-79.
82. Some commentators have attempted to distinguish full faith and credit requirements
applicable to fraternal benefit societies from those applicable to corporations. Fraternal benefit
society cases could have resulted from attempts by the Supreme Court to protect the solvency of
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have been severely limited, if not overruled sub silentio, by subsequent deci-
sions.
8 3
Professor Kirgis has proposed the following formulation of the full faith
and credit limitation upon choice of law by a forum: A forum shall be able
to apply its law to a transaction or occurrence unless (a) another state has an
interest in applying its law that is overwhelming in comparison with the
interest of the forum, or (b) there is an overwhelming reason to decide all
similar cases according to one legal system, and a state other than the forum
clearly should be the "bellwether."8a 4 This standard seems both workable
and consistent with precedent. According to the first standard, a forum
could apply its law to arguably foreign or technically foreign corporations,
since another state would not have a greater interest in applying its law than
the forum. The second standard proposed by Kirgis may apply to the regu-
lation of corporations with multi-state contacts. A number of questions per-
taining to corporate internal affairs probably require uniformity of
regulation.8 5 Most commentators who adhere to this view assume that the
law governing such questions should always be the law of the state of incor-
poration .86
Certain internal matters, however, do not seem to require uniform na-
tional regulation. States frequently regulate matters such as the ability of
forum shareholders to review the shareholder list pertaining to foreign corpo-
rations or the type of reports and other information which must be given by
a foreign corporation to shareholders residing in the state. In addition, New
York enacted a statutory scheme in the early 1960s which provided that cer-
tain sections of the New York law would govern pseudo-foreign corpora-
the financially unstable fraternal benefit organizations. See Note, Full Faith and Credit. Preferen-
tial Treatment of Fraternal Insurers, 57 YALE L.J. 139, 141 (1947). Professor Baraf contends that
these organizations are distinguishable from regular corporations due (a) to their "prerequisites
for entry into membership (b) the multifarious purposes for which organized (c) the pecuniary
policies it must pursue and (d) the 'non-fraternal' procedures of'corporate democracy.' " Baraf,
supra note 8, at 244.
83. See Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Duncan, 221 F.2d 703 (6th
Cir. 1955). See generally Baraf, supra note 8, at 244; Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6
VAND. L. REV. 581, 596 (1953); Harper, The Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 883, 895-97 (1947); Kaplan, supra note 13, at 446; Reese & Kaufman, supra note 8, at 1131
n.5 3 .
The Court in Clay referred to W1l4"e, the most recent fraternal benefit society case, as a
"highly specialized decision dealing with unique facts." Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S.
179, 183 (1964).
84. Kirgis, supra note 40, at 120.
85. See Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws, 63 HARV. L. REV. 433, 466
(1950); Cowett, Reorgamzations, Consolidations, Mergers and Related Corporate Events under the Blue Sky
Laws, 13 Bus. LAw. 760 (1958); Gibson & Freeman, A Decade of the Model Business Corporation Act
in iiginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 1396 (1967); Horowitz, The Commerce Clause As a Limitation on State
Choice of Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806, 817-18 (1971); Kirgis, supra note 40, at 120; Reese
& Kaufman, supra note 8.
86. See, e.g., Cary, Federahm and Corporate Law. Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
669 (1974). Other commentators, however, suggest that it might be possible to apply the law of
the commercial domicile of a foreign corporation if it has few contacts with its state of incorpo-
ration and substantial contacts with one state. See Coleman, supra note 85, at 466; Horowitz,




tions. 87 Among the areas regulated are the liability of directors, the
enforcement of dissenters' rights, the indemnification of directors, and the
merger of domestic and foreign corporations. a8 This scheme does not seem
to have generated any significant problems; no cases have been brought
under the statute.
A number of commentators have argued that chaos would result if cer-
tain other internal affairs of corporations with multi-state contacts were gov-
erned by the laws of more than one state.89 Particularly troublesome are
distributions to shareholders, the issuance of shares, the stockholders' voting
rights, the minimum percentage of votes required to approve a reorganiza-
tion, and the transactions in which dissenters' rights arise; a significant bur-
den would be placed upon corporate activity if the standards for such
actions were unclear. The states' corporate laws provide different standards
for the same corporate acts.
For example, many state statutes provide that "distributions" (includ-
ing dividends and share repurchases) may be paid out of "capital surplus"; 90
other states provide that even if a company does not have capital surplus, it
may make distributions out of the prior year's earnings. 9 ' California has
adopted an entirely different approach: a corporation is permitted to make
distributions out of its retained earnings. In addition, distributions are al-
lowed if minimum levels of assets-to-liabilities ratios (post-distribution) are
met.92 It is entirely possible that a corporation could satisfy the Delaware-
type standard and not satisfy the California standard.
93
Other more significant conflicts between state corporate laws could re-
sult. For example, the laws of many states, including Delaware, make cumu-
lative voting for directors optional; 94 it is only permitted if such a provision
is included in the corporation's articles or bylaws. Contrastingly, under Cal-
ifornia and Illinois law cumulative voting is mandatory. 95 (This require-
ment is one of those applicable to California pseudo-foreign corporations
87. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1315-1320 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80). New York
pseudo-foreign corporations are subject to the following provisions of the New York corpora-
tions code: section 1315 (the release of a list of shareholders to a shareholder upon demand);
section 1316 (voting trust records); section 719, except subsection (a)(3) thereof (liability of di-
rectors); section 720 (actions against a director or officer); section 1318 (information to share-
holders); section 623 (dissenters' rights); section 626 (shareholder derivative actions); section 627
(security for expenses in a derivative action); sections 721-727 (indemnification of directors and
officers); and section 907 (merger of domestic and foreign corporations).
88. See generally Baraf, supra note 8, at 229-32; Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27, at 1324-
27.
89. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 241 (1968); Coleman, supra note 85,
at 466; Reese & Kaufman, supra note 8.
90. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 154, 160 (1974 & Supp. 1978).
91. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1974).
92. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 500-505 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978).
93. A corporation obviously could have earnings in a year and satisfy the Delaware stan-
dard for a nimble dividend and not have retained earnings or an adequate assets-to-liabilities
ratio. Of course, the opposite could also occur. See Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27, at 1308.
94. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 618 (McKinney
1963).
95. CAL. CORP. CODE § 708 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.28
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
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pursuant to section 2115.) Massachusetts proscribes cumulative voting.
96
Consequently, it would be possible to have a Massachusetts corporation gov-
erned by section 2115 of the California Corporations Code and thereby have
the California Code make a provision mandatory that is prohibited by the
law of the state of incorporation. The more common situation will be that a
Delaware or Nevada corporation will be governed by section 2115, and such
corporations rarely provide for cumulative voting in the articles or bylaws.
A corporation confronted with this conflict in governing law would probably
seek a declaratory judgment prior to the shareholders' meeting, regarding
the procedure for counting votes for directors.9 7
Another important difference among state corporate codes is the stan-
dard set forth for the approval of mergers and other reorganizations. Cer-
tain state laws require the approval of two-thirds of the shareholders to any
such corporate reorganization; 98 other states merely require majority ap-
proval.99 In a reorganization, if it were unclear whether the corporation was
governed by two-thirds or by majority approval, once again a declaratory
judgment would probably be required to determine whether the reorganiza-
tion had been appropriately ratified by the shareholders.
This discussion indicates that significant problems would arise if the
ability of a corporation to make distributions to shareholders, to participate
in reorganizations, and to vote cumulatively for directors were governed by
the law of more than one state.' °° The corporation might be required to
satisfy the most restrictive statute. This can be done in certain instances.
The problems, however, cannot be so glibly dismissed. If the law of one
regulating state provides for straight voting for directors and the other regu-
lating state requires cumulative voting, there is no "most restrictive statute."
Similarly, it would be unclear whether a reorganization, which received an
affirmative vote of fifty-five percent of the shareholders, would be approved
if the law of one regulating state required a majority approval of sharehold-
ers and the law of another state required two-thirds approval. Perhaps the
requirement of two-thirds approval could be considered the most restrictive
96. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156, § 32 (West 1970).
97. For example, Arden-Mayfair, Inc. was a Delaware corporation which satisfied the stan-
dard set forth in section 2115 of the California Corporations Code for California pseudo-foreign
corporations. At that time, the board of Arden-Mayfair served staggered terms and directors
were elected non-cumulatively. Louart Corporation, a major shareholder in Arden-Mayfair,
sought to have all directors elected cumulatively at the annual shareholders meeting pursuant
to section 2115. See generall Louart Corp. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., No. C 192091, minute order
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct., June 30, 1977). In this action, the California court held section
2115, insofar as it requires cumulative voting and the annual election of directors, unconstitu-
tional as applied to Arden-Mayfair. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 22-23 (on file
with author) (filed with the court April 27, 1978). An action for declaratory judgment was filed
in Delaware by Arden-Mayfair while the California action was progressing. See Palmer v. Ar-
den-Mayfair, Inc. No. 5549, (Del. Ch. Newcastle County July 6 (1978), mem. opinion (on file with
the author). In that case the Delaware court noted the California decision summarized above
and ordered the annual meeting of Arden-Mayfair to be held under Delaware law.
98. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 902, 903, 909 (McKinney Supp. 1979); VA. CODE
13.1-70, 13.1-77 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.64, 157.72 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
99. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1200, 1201 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 251, 271 (19 7 4 & Supp. 1978).
100. See generally Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27.
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statute, but it appears that as a practical matter there would be a considera-
ble amount of time spent determining which statute would govern and
whether the reorganization could go forward. The potential for substantial
stock price fluctuations and the inevitable securities act lawsuits which
would ensue from such fluctuations would make a securities lawyer cringe at
such uncertainty.
It was argued above that certain questions pertaining to the internal
affairs of a corporation require uniform national regulation. If this is true,
the next question which must be addressed is what the nature of this law
should be. Perhaps the most logical result would be the adoption of a fed-
eral corporation law for truly national corporations.10 ' For a number of
reasons, the enactment of a federal corporation law appears both unlikely
and unwise. For national and domestic corporations, the law of the state of
incorporation therefore should be applied to questions pertaining to the in-
ternal affairs. This should be required by full faith and credit. Certainty in
choice of law would result from such a policy, and there would be no other
state with an overwhelming interest in regulating such corporations.
In contrast, there is apparently no persuasive rationale for applying the
law of the state of incorporation to technically foreign corporations or argua-
bly foreign corporations.' 0 2 The state of commercial domicile has a more
significant relationship and greater interest in regulating such corporations
than the state of incorporation. The mention of such an idea always causes
corporate lawyers to shriek in unison "but what about certainty in corporate
choice of law?" There are a number of persuasive responses. It seems a bit
absurd to sacrifice all policy concerns in the area of corporate choice of law
on the alter of certainty. 0 3 Moreover, in a number of cases such uncertainty
could be rectified by reincorporating in the state of commercial domicile.'
0 4
As a practical matter, certainty does not currently exist regarding questions
pertaining to the internal affairs of technically foreign corporations; some
courts apply local law to such corporations.' 0 5 A statutory scheme which
would clearly define the scope and timing procedures for the application of
the law of the commercial domicile to the internal affairs of pseudo-foreign
101. A number of commentators have suggested such a statute. Although certain commen-
tators have suggested such a statute throughout the twentieth century, see Brabner-Smith, Fed-
eral Incorporation of Business, 24 VA. L. REV. 159 (1937); Grosscup, The Federal Corporation Problem
and the Lawyer's Part in its Solution, 39 AM. L. REV. 835, 849-51 (1905); Reuschlein, Federaliza-
tion-Desgnfor Corporate Reform in a National Economy, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (1942); Snapp, Na-
tional Incorporation, 5 ILL. L. REV. 414 (1911), the idea seemed to be advanced by many
individuals in the early 1970's. See generally Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering for Big Business:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 915 (1972); Jennings, supra note 7;
Schwartz, supra note 7; Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89 (1972).
See generally Oldham, Book Review, supra note 12. It was discussed above that such a federal
corporation law would be unwise. See notes 28-34 and accompanying text, supra.
102. See, e.g., Kirgis, supra note 40, at 140-42; Oldham, supra note 2.
103. Brainerd Currie has noted that if certainty of result were the only concern relevant to
choice of law, a good choice of law rule would be to apply the law of the interested state first in
alphabetical order. See Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28
U. CHI. L. REV. 258, 279 (1961).
104. See H. MARSH, 18 CALIFORNIA PRACTICE-CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 24.18 (1978).
105. Set Oldham, supra note 2, at 93-98.
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corporations would eventually result in at least equal (and probably greater)
certainty in corporate choice of law for technically foreign 10 6 and arguably
foreign corporations and advance more sensible policies.'0 7 (Of course, stat-
utes such as some of the takeover laws of certain states which provide that
the laws apply to any corporation whose "principal place of business" is in
the state, or which has "substantial assets" in the state, 0 8 without defining
these terms, should obviously be avoided.) For example, the California
scheme has incorporated filing procedures and specific rules regarding the
time during which California law will govern pseudo-foreign corporations
and the sections of California law which will govern them. Admittedly,
some uncertainty has resulted regarding what law applies to such corpora-
tions, at least during the interim period while such statutory schemes become
accepted. It is presently unclear whether courts of the state of incorporation
will enforce pseudo-foreign corporation laws of another jurisdiction.'0 9
It should be noted that the application of the law of the state of incorpo-
ration to the internal affairs of a technically foreign corporation or an argua-
bly foreign corporation may constitute a violation of the full faith and credit
clause, since the state of commercial domicile has an overwhelming interest
in regulating the corporation as compared to the state of incorporation. '10
The enforceability of the California and New York pseudo-foreign cor-
poration choice of law statutes currently depends, as a practical matter,
upon the state in which suit is brought.I" If the action is brought in the
106. Such a scheme could increase the certainty of the law applicable to technically foreign
corporations, since currently it is somewhat unclear whether the state of the commercial domi-
cile would apply local law or the law of the state of incorporation to questions pertaining to the
internal affairs of such a corporation. If full faith and credit requires the application of the
pseudo-foreign corporation law of the commercial domicile of a pseudo-foreign corporation
rather than the law of the state of incorporation, this would definitely increase certainty in
corporate choice of law regarding pseudo-foreign corporations.
107. See Kirgis, supra note 40, at 141-42. Many civil law countries do not follow the rule
that the law of the place of incorporation governs a corporation's internal affairs. See generaly
Latty, supra note 2, at 167 n.134. In these countries the law either of the "social seat" (siege
social) or the principal place of business (centre dexploitation) applies to such questions. See
generally 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 33-35 (2d ed. 1960); Vagts, The Multhnational
Enterprise, A New Challengefor Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 740 (1970); Note, The "Na-
tisnality" ofnternational Corporations Under Civil Law and Treaty, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (1961).
Laity notes that this choice of law rule evolved as a result of England's relatively lax corporation
laws in the Nineteenth Century. Businesses apparently were chartered in England and then
conducted business in France and other parts of Europe. See Latty, supra note 2, at 166 n. 130.
A corporation's social seat is generally said to be the place of its "central administration."
The determination of a corporation's social seat normally depends upon where its executive
offices are located and where shareholders and directors meetings are held. See Hadri, The Choice
ofNational Law Applicable to the Multi-National Enterprise and The Natonality ofSuch Enterprises, 1974
DUKE L.J. 1, 7. Although in some instances a corporation's social seat is unclear (see Latty,
supra note 2, at 168), the civil law choice of law rule for corporations has generally been a
workable approach. See generally 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1960); Latty,
supra note 2, at 166-72; Vagts, supra note 107.
108. See generally Note, The Consttutionality ofState Takeover Statutes. A Response to Great West-
ern, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 872, 881 (1978) [hereinafter cited State Takeover Statutes/.
109. It was noted above that in the litigation relating to the election of directors of Arden-
Mayfair, Inc., even though Arden-Mayfair satisfied the standard for a California pseudo-foreign
corporation set forth in California's code, a Delaware court held that the Arden-Mayfair annual
meeting of shareholders should be held pursuant to Delaware law.
110. See Kirgis, supra note 40, at 142 n.87; Oldham, supra note 2, at 119.
111. See Oldham, supra note 2, at 123-30.
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state of incorporation, the forum will probably apply its law and not the
pseudo-foreign corporation statute; if suit is brought in the state of commer-
cial domicile, the forum will probably apply its pseudo-foreign corporation
law, unless it is deemed unconstitutional. This obvious forum-shopping
problem (and the related burden on commerce) could be greatly amelio-
rated, and certainty in corporate choice of law regarding pseudo-foreign cor-
porations could be greatly advanced, by establishing the following rule: if a
corporation has minimal contacts with its state of incorporation and has sub-
stantial contacts with a state that has adopted a pseudo-foreign corporation
law (thereby showing its interest in applying its law to such corporation),
and the foreign corporation satisfies the test for jurisdiction incorporated in
the pseudo-foreign corporation law, full faith and credit should require the
application of the law of the commercial domicile rather than the state of
incorporation.
The uncertainty which would remain would be whether the corporation
had "significant contacts" with the state of incorporation. Given this uncer-
tainty, the rule should provide that if the state of commercial domicile has
enacted a law which attempts to assure that only corporations whose com-
mercial domicile is within that state are governed by that law,1 12 full faith
and credit should require the application of such a law to the exclusion of
the law of the state of incorporation, regardless of the contacts between the
corporation and the state of incorporation.
It has been noted that different forums use substantially different tests
to establish whether they have a substantial interest in regulating foreign
corporations. For example, the various state tender offer laws consider the
number of shareholders and the number of employees which reside in the
state, the location of the corporation's principal executive offices, the amount
of assets in the state, and the amount of revenues the corporation derived
from the state, among others. t t 3 The New York statutory scheme pertaining
to the internal affairs of foreign corporations considers the percentage of rev-
enues the corporation derived from New York.' t 4 The California statute
considers the number of shareholders, employees, revenues, and assets lo-
cated or generated in California.' 1 5
It is certainly possible that a tender offer could be governed by the
tender offer laws of two or more states. For example, when Great Western
tendered for the shares of Sunshine Mining Company, it was initially consid-
ered possible that the tender offer would simultaneously be regulated by
112. California's statutory scheme would arguably fall within this group of statutes, since it
considers a number of factors in connection with the determination and requires that the aver-
age of these contacts exceeds 50% and that 50% of the shareholders reside in California.
To the extent that the various state tender offer laws purport to govern a foreign corpora-
tion with "substantial assets" in the state or which has its "executive office" or "principal place
of business" within the state, such laws are obviously undesirable. These terms are vague and
do not ensure that the state will have the dominant interest in regulating the corporation.
113. Seegenerally E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 207 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tender Offers].
114. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1320 (MeKinney 1963).
115. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2108, 2115 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978).
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three state takeover laws.'16 It should be emphasized, however, as to ques-
tions pertaining to state regulation of affairs of foreign corporations which
required uniform national regulation, full faith and credit was only required
to be given to those state laws which made a reasonable attempt to limit
their application to only those corporations that had more than fifty percent
of their contacts with the state. No state tender offer law approaches this
standard. For this reason, state tender offer laws, insofar as they attempt to
extraterritorially regulate tender offers made pertaining to foreign corpora-
tions, should be deemed to violate due process, and the application of such
laws would not be required by the full faith and credit clause. The tender
offer law of the state of incorporation, if there is such a law, should be given
full faith and credit by all states.'
t 7
The California scheme regulating certain internal affairs of pseudo-for-
eign corporations requires that fifty percent of the corporation's shareholders
reside in California and that the average of the corporation's property, pay-
roll, and sales located in or derived from California exceed fifty percent. 1"8
This standard makes a reasonable attempt to limit the application of the
statute to those corporations in which California has the predominant inter-
est in regulating. Although different standards are conceivable, as long as
the state standard included more than one contact between the corporation
and the state, and required that the contacts with the states exceed fifty
percent, it would appear highly unlikely that a corporation would satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of more than one such statute.1 19
A related question which arises is what law should apply to a techni-
cally foreign or arguably foreign corporation whose commercial domicile has
not adopted a statute such as California. Then, certainty in choice of law
becomes a concern. Possibly at some point it will become the accepted rule
that, regardless of whether the state of commercial domicile has adopted a
pseudo-foreign corporation statute, the law of the commercial domicile ap-
plies to a pseudo-foreign corporation. (Such a rule would not evolve without
116. See State Takeover Statutes supra note 108, at 888 n.125.
117. It could be argued that only the sections of the state tender offer law which require
uniform national regulation should be given full faith and credit rather than the whole tender
offer law. This may be true in principle, but as a practical matter it would probably create a
great deal of uncertainty as to which provisions must be given full faith and credit. For this
reason, the whole tender offer law of the state of incorporation should be given full faith and
credit by all other states. This general rule regarding giving full faith and credit to the tender
offer law of the state of incorporation is subject to the pseudo-foreign corporation exception
discussed herein.
118. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West Supp. 1978).
119. Accord, Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27, at 1324-27. It may be advisable for the
statute to consider both the percentage of shareholders residing in the state as well as certain
business contacts (such as assets in the state, principal executive offices in the state, or revenue
derived from the state) between the corporation and the state. If the statute covers both types of
contacts, it would be even less likely that a company could satisfy more than one of such laws.
An interesting example of the fringe area of pseudo-foreign corporations is Great W.
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aJ'd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cit.
1978), reo'don oenuegrounds, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979). Sunshine,
the target company, was a Washington corporation with no significant contacts with Washing-
ton. Its principal executive offices and more than 50% of its assets were located in Idaho, and it
conducted a significant amount of business in New York. Sunshine's main subsidiary was a
Delaware corporation which conducted a great deal of its business in Maryland.
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the states adopting pseudo-foreign corporation statutes.) If this occurs, such
a rule could be applied and the corporation, if clearly a "tramp" pseudo-
foreign corporation, would be certain what law would govern its internal
affairs. Until such a rule evolves, however, technically foreign and arguably
foreign corporations should be governed by the law of their respective states
of incorporation; any other result would leave the corporation unsure which
law governed its internal affairs. Even assuming such a new choice of law
rule would develop, the problem would still exist as to what constituted a
pseudo-foreign corporation; until a workable definition evolves or until the
state of commercial domicile would adopt a pseudo-foreign corporation stat-
ute, the corporation would be unsure which law governed its internal affairs.
C. Commerce Clause
Arguably, certain state regulations of corporate affairs violate the Con-
stitution's commerce clause.' 20 It has been suggested that pseudo-foreign
corporation laws' 2 ' and tender offer laws 122 place an impermissible burden
upon interstate commerce.
1. General Rules
It is somewhat difficult to predict whether courts will conclude that
pseudo-foreign corporation laws or tender offer laws impose impermissible
burdens on interstate commerce. Few appellate courts have confronted
these questions, 123 and the guidelines for what constitutes an impermissible
burden are vague and depend upon a number of considerations. The extent
of the restriction on state power imposed by the commerce clause has fre-
quently been stated by the Supreme Court in a manner that begs the ques-
tion and provides little guidance. For example, the Court has often
concluded that the burden imposed upon commerce by a state statute is
"direct" or "indirect," depending upon whether the statute is to be upheld
or deemed unconstitutional. 1
24
Nevertheless, it is possible to set forth some general rules. If the state
statute is deemed to discriminate against interstate commerce, or to favor
local business vis-a-vis out of state business, such statutes are almost always
ruled unconstitutional. 125 Courts generally uphold regulation if the subject
120. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
121. See Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27.
122. See Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 225.
123. Accord, Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977). A few
district courts have recently considered the constitutionality of state tender offer laws. See gener-
aly AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979); City Investing Co. v.
Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112 (D.C. Ind. 1979); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97, 154 (E.D. Va., September 3, 1979); Telco Marketing Services, Inc. v. Hospital
Financial Corp., No. 79 C 2343 (N.D. Il. June 11, 1979); Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter, No. 79-1253
(E.D. La. May 3, 1979); Mite Corp. v. Dixon, No. 79 C 200 (N.D. Ill. February 9, 1979); Uarco,
Inc. v. Daylin, Inc., No. 798 C 4246 (N.D. I1. November 27, 1978); Dart Indus. Inc. v. Conrad,
462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978); Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (BNA) at A-I
(Del. Ch. Ct., December 14, 1979).
124. See generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
125. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); H.P. Hood and Sons, Inc. v.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). See generally Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA.
[Vol. 57:3
REGULA TING THE REGULATORS
matter is deemed one "of local concern" which Congress has not regu-
lated. 126 The trick, of course, is discerning when a matter is of local concern.
The Court has sometimes been quite generous in its willingness to find the
matter one of local concern; the regulation of the interstate marketing of the
California raisin crop' 27 and pollution control of ships traveling upon the
Great Lakes have been deemed local in nature.
128
Recent decisions have stated that the validity of state statutes under the
commerce clause will generally be determined by balancing the burden
upon commerce against the local benefit derived therefrom. 129 Professor
Dowling has argued that a state regulation will only be deemed an imper-
missible burden when that burden exceeds its local benefits. 130 In the fa-
mous case of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,' 13 1 the Supreme Court set forth the
standard of review of state statutes under the commerce clause in this man-
ner:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a le-
gitimate local public interest and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree, and the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will, of course, depend on the nature of the local interest
involved and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities. Occasionally, the court has can-
didly undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these issues
132
Pike suggests the following considerations: the nature and extent of the local
benefit advanced, the extent of the burden imposed upon interstate com-
merce by the statute, and the existence of an alternative way of advancing
the state interest with a lesser impact on interstate commerce.
2. Burdens Upon Interstate Commerce
A. Pseudo Foreign Corporation Laws
The different state regulatory statutes discussed herein obviously impose
different burdens upon interstate commerce. Pseudo-foreign corporation
laws, such as California's, currently do place a burden on interstate com-
merce, but primarily because of the uncertainty of whether the internal af-
fairs would be governed by the law of the state of incorporation or by
California, its commercial domicile. If and when it becomes settled that the
L. REV. 1 (1940); Dowling Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 547 (1947).
126. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
127. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
128. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
129. See generall Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Aldens, Inc. v.
Packel, 524 F.2d 38 (3rd Cir. 1975).
130. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. I (1940).
131. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
132. Id. at 142 (citation omitted). This test has been considered the appropriate standard
for commerce clause review of state statutes in a number of cases, including Great Western United.
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internal affairs of pseudo-foreign corporations should be governed by the
pseudo-foreign corporation law of the commercial domicile (if such a law
exists), rather than the law of the state of incorporation, minimal burdens on
interstate commerce would then result from pseudo-foreign corporation
laws.
A current example of the type of burden imposed by pseudo-foreign
corporation laws is reflected in the Arden-Mqayfair litigation. Arden-Mayfair
was a Delaware corporation that satisfied the California pseudo-foreign cor-
poration tests. It was unclear whether Delaware or California law governed
certain internal affairs of the corporation, including the method for the elec-
tion of its directors. Suits were initiated in both California and Delaware to
resolve, among other things, whether votes for directors should be cumu-
lated. 133 The California court concluded that the California provision, as
applied to Arden-Mayfair and the method of its election of directors, placed
an impermissible burden on interstate commerce and was therefore uncon-
stitutional. The court ordered that the election of Arden-Mayfair's directors
be held pursuant to Delaware law.' 34 By the time the Delaware court re-
viewed the matter, the California decision had been rendered; the Delaware
court merely reiterated the California holding.
135
Arden-Mayfair represents the extreme example of the types of burdens
currently imposed upon interstate commerce by the pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion laws. California required a transaction be carried out in one way, while
Delaware required the transaction be carried out in a significantly different
manner. It was impossible to comply with both; the directors either had to
be elected cumulatively or by straight voting.
Of course, other types of conflicts could result. 3 6 In addition to Arden-
Mayfair's cumulative voting dilemma, corporate reorganizations (and dis-
senters' rights relating thereto), corporate distributions and repurchases of a
corporation's shares, and the legality of the indemnification of corporate of-
ficers or directors all could be sources of conflict between the state of incor-
poration and pseudo-foreign corporation law.
B. State Tender Offer Laws
State takeover laws' 37 impose burdens on interstate commerce in addi-
tion to those resulting from the pseudo-foreign corporation laws. Added to
the problem of uncertainty as to which state law is applicable to the transac-
tion, state takeover laws place a number of unique burdens on commerce.
Many takeover laws provide for more extensive disclosure than required
under the Williams Act. A significant number of state laws grant with-
133. See generally Louart Corp. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., No. C-192091 (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. June 30, 1977); Palmer v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., No. 5549 (Del. Ch., New Castle
County 1978).
134. Minute Order in Louart Corp. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., No. C-192091 (Los Angeles
County Superior Court July 6, 1979). The order is dated June 30, 1977.
135. See Palmer v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., No. 5549 (Del. Ch., Newcastle County 1978).
136. See notes 91-101 supra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 218-43 trfra and accompanying text for an extensive discussion of state take-
over laws.
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drawal rights to a target company's shareholders for a period exceeding that
provided in the Williams Act, thereby making it less clear to the bidder,
until a later date, how many shares are definitely tendered. State law pro
rata repurchase requirements sometimes extend beyond the period set forth
in the Williams Act, forcing the bidder to buy more shares to satisfy both the
Williams Act pro rata repurchase requirements and the requirements of the
various state laws.
Moreover, between the notice of intention to make a tender offer and
the date the tender offer commences, the market for target company's securi-
ties will be highly unstable and might require the cessation of trading for
that stock.' 38 If the stock exchange or the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) suspends trading of the target company's stock, this obviously
would dry up the market for these shares during that period. If trading is
not suspended, however, there is normally a very active market for shares for
which a tender offer is to be made. i39
State takeover laws seem to encourage bidders to use the "bear hug"
tender offer approach: the bidder first makes a takeover proposal to the tar-
get company's management. If target management does not approve the
offer (thereby foreclosing taking advantage of the "friendly offer" exemption
contained in most state takeover laws), the bidder would then make a tender
offer at a lower price to the shareholders. 140 Similarly, since state takeover
laws tend to facilitate the entry of a third-party bidder, the initial tender
offer may be lower than what otherwise would have been made, in anticipa-
tion of further bidding. 
14 '
By far the most significant burden of the state takeover laws, however,
results from the delay created by most laws. 142 State takeover laws generally
prolong tender offers, since many state takeover laws require a waiting pe-
riod between the required filing of a notice of intention to make a tender
offer and the date upon which the offer commences. Thus, the offer remains
open longer than required under federal law. In addition, a number of state
takeover laws provide that, upon request from target management, the state
securities commission must hold a hearing regarding the adequacy of disclo-
sure in the tender offer document and the fairness of the terms of the offer.
138. Both the district court and the circuit court in the Great Western United case seemed
concerned about this possibility. The New York Stock Exchange also believes this to be a possi-
bility. See SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at A-12 (June 1969).
139. See generally Note, supra note 108; Troubh, Purchased Afectian: A Primer on Cash Tender
Offers, HARV. Bus. REV., July-August (1976). For example, two recently announced tender
offers caused the market of the target company's stock to be quite active. See Acquisittin Offer of
$480,000,000 i made for ERC, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1979, at 5, col. I (western edition); Warnerand
Swasey is Target of Offer by Canada Firm, Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1979, at 4, col. I (western edition).
140. The district court in Great Western United voiced this concern. 439 F. Supp. at 438.
141. This point was made by the circuit court in Great Western United. See 577 F.2d at 1283.
142. For example, one study found that, prior to the widespread enactment of state takeover
laws, more than 2/3 of all tender offers were completed 22 days after the announcement of the
tender offer. See Ebeid, Tender Offers- Characteristcs A ecttg Their Success, MERGERS & AcQuISI-
TIONS 24 (1976). Because of the waiting period and mandatory hold-open period set forth in
most state takeover laws, the average tender offer now takes much longer to complete.
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The tender may not commence until such hearings have occurred.'
43
One result of the delay is that the offeror's expenses are increased.'
44
Frequently, tender offers are financed and the bidder must pay a daily com-
mitment fee for the financing; the longer the tender offer remains open, the
greater the financing fee. Further, the bidder's expenses are increased by
having to deal with the various state securities commissions and having to
appear at any required hearings.
Aside from the economic hardship on the offeror, the waiting period
also gives target management time to communicate its position to target
shareholders and generally engage in defensive tactics. A variety of defen-
sive tactics may be attempted by the target company: issuing additional
shares to friendly shareholders, attempting to enter into a merger with a
third party, or wooing another buyer. 145 It is unclear whether these defen-
sive tactics permit target management to defeat bidders more frequently in
contested tender offers. 1
46
143. See notes 227-31 tnfia and accompanying text for a discussion of the provisions regard-
ing such hearings and waiting periods.
144. See generaly Bromberg, Tender Offers. Safeguards and Strengths-An Interest Analysis, 21
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 613, 651 (1970).
145. See generally Fleischer, Defensive Tactics in Tender Ofers, 9 REV. SEC. REG. 853 (1976);
Reuben & Elden, How to bea Target Company, 23 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 423 (1978); Schmults & Kelly,
Cash Takeover Bids Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115 (1968). See, e.g., Bell Industries Plans Anti-
Takeover Moves: Shareholders to Vote, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1979, at 45, col. 4.
On October 18, 1979 Dominion Bridge indicated its desire to tender for the shares of
Warner & Swasey Co. Warner & Swasey's management resisted the proposed tender offer. The
Ohio Division of Securities did not approve the adequacy of Dominion Bridge's disclosure docu-
ment until more than two months had elapsed. During that time, a "white knight" third-party
bidder, Bendix Corp., was located. Warner-Swasy Takeover Fight's Stakes Increased, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 17, 1979, at 5, col. 1.
146. Sometimes bidders may not make an actual tender offer after the announcement of an
intention to make a tender offer if target management actively engages in defensive tactics
between the time the intention to tender is announced and the date the tender is to occur.
Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 882, 889 n.28
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Steinbrink].
One study found that of the contested cash tender offers and exchange offers studied that
were made from 1972 through 1975, 78% were either completely or partially successful. Austin,
Tender Offer Statistics.- New Strategies Are Paying Off, MERGERS & AcQuisITIONS 11-14 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Austin, Tender Offers Statistics]. A later study conducted by the same writer
found that the probability of success in connection with a contested tender offer decreased sig-
nificantly during 1976 and 1977. It was found that of the 18 contested tender offers made in
1977 that were studied, only 10 were completely or partially successful; 45% were unsuccessful.
Similarly, of the 26 contested tender offers made in 1976 that were studied, only 13 were com-
pletely or partially successful; 50% were unsuccessful. See generally Austin, Study Reveals Trends in
Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Offers, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1978, at 25, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as
Austin, Study Reveals Friends in Tactics, Premtiwns Success Rates in Offers.]
Professor Austin contends that these figures suggest that, because of the state takeover laws
and the increasing use of defensive tactics by target management, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to make a successful tender offer. Another article interprets this information differ-
ently. See generally Comment, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great
Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 872 n.2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NYU Comment]. This article
notes that, of the contested tender offers made during 1976 and 1977 deemed "unsuccessful" by
Professor Austin, a third-party bidder frequently gained control of the target company. It is
stated that of the 18 tender offers made in 1977 that were studied by Austin, in 16 (88%) of these
either the initial bidder or a third-party bidder was partially or completely successful. Simi-
larly, of the 26 tender offers made in 1976 that were studied by Austin, the initial bidder or a
third-party bidder was completely or partially successful in 80% of the offers. (These findings
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A separate problem is created by the rights of the state securities com-
missions to hold hearings regarding the adequacy of the disclosure and the
fairness of the transaction. These hearings may either be held upon motion
by the commission itself or upon request by target management. 147 A re-
quest for a hearing by target management is a defensive tactic often used to
postpone a tender offer. The tender offer will be held at bay until the securi-
ties commission is satisfied that the disclosure is adequate and the terms are
fair. In addition, if the state securities commission does not approve the de-
gree of disclosure or the terms of the transaction, the tender may be enjoined
by the securities commission.
148
A significant result of the delays imposed by the state takeover laws is
that the initial bidder is less likely to be successful.' 49 In a growing number
of cases, the initial bidder is defeated by a "white knight" third-party bid-
der. 150 It is unsettled whether target management is more successful in re-
taining control in contested offers because of the state laws.' 5 '
State takeover laws, in their current form, may dampen the interest of
were made by the authors of the NYU Comment after they reviewed Professor Austin's basic
research (correspondence with Austin on file with the author)).
It appears from the additional statistics noted in the NYU Comment that Professor Austin
overemphasizes the significance of the diminishing success rate of the initial bidder in a con-
tested tender offer. Without knowing the percentage of instances during which a third-party
bidder gained control of the target company in the contested tender offers studied by Austin
during 1972 through 1975, however, it is impossible to know whether target management is now
more successful in combating tender offers, or whether the only change is that the initial bidder
is now more frequently defeated by a third party.
147. For example, the management of Cedar Point Inc. requested such a hearing regarding
the tender for its shares by MCA Inc. Cedar Point Pursues Ruling on Tender Offr, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Dec. 20, 1979, § C, at 1, col. 6.
148. For example, the terms of the proposed tender offer by APL Corporation for the shares
of Pabst Brewing were not approved by the Wisconsin Commissioner of Securities. This reluc-
tance on the part of the Wisconsin Commissioner of Securities to approve the terms of the
proposed tender offer significantly frustrated the ability of APL to make the tender offer. See
generally Pabst Buys Stake Heldby SuiorAPL: Takeover FeudEnds, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1979, at 19,
col. I (western edition).
State securities commissioners have rarely found the terms of a proposed tender unfair,
however. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 116 n.49 (1979).
149. Of all contested tender offers occurring from 1972 through 1975 studied by one com-
mentator, 78% were either successful (meaning that the number of shares requested by the bid-
der were tendered) or partially successful (meaning that the bidder accepted tenders for less
than the number of shares requested). Austin, Tender Ofer Statistics, supra note 146, at 12-14.
This commentator also studied contested tender offers made during 1976 and 1977, and found
that bidders were either partially or completely successful in 1976 in only 50% of the contested
tender offers studied and partially or completely successful in 1977 in 55% of the contested
tenders studied. Austin, Study Reveals Trend in Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Ofers, supra note
146, at 35.
150. See generally Austin, Study Reveals Trend in Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Offers, supra
note 146. A third-party bidder not friendly to target management is sometimes referred to as a
"grey knight."
151. See note 146 supra. If a third-party bidder friendly to existing target management
prevails, target management may be retained or even receive a long-term employment contract
in connection with the transaction. Even if a third-party friendly bidder prevails in the tender
offer, target shareholders are able to sell their shares at the tender premium. Based on the
results of Austin's studies (and the information contained in the NYU Comment), it appears
that target shareholders are able to sell their shares at the tender premium in about the same
percentage of contested tender offers as they were able to prior to the extensive enactment of
state takeover laws. Of course, Austin's comparative figures do not reflect the numbers of
tender offers discouraged by state takeover laws.
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arbitrageurs in a tender offer. Arbitrageurs play a very important role in a
tender offer. 15 2 Arbitrageurs buy shares of a target company on the open
market after a tender is announced, with the hope of receiving the full
tender premium for the shares within a short period after the arbitrage
purchase. If it appears that the state securities commission will not allow the
tender to commence, or even if the commission significantly delays the
tender, arbitrageurs may be less interested in participating.
When state takeover laws were initially enacted, commentators pre-
dicted that tender offers would no longer be effective vehicles for acquiring
control of companies. 15 3 Although these predictions were less than pre-
scient, the data discussed above do suggest that the probability of an initial
bidder in a contested tender offer gaining control of the target company has
decreased in the last few years. This could be attributed to the opportunity
of target management to use defensive tactics as a result of the enactment of
takeover statutes by many states and the more frequent appearance of a
"white knight" third-party bidder.
In addition to decreasing the likelihood that initial bidders will be suc-
cessful in a contested tender offer, state takeover laws probably have a "chil-
ling effect" upon tenders. A number of effects of state takeover laws
probably discourage tenders. First, it seems less likely that the intial bidder
will be successful, and second, the delayed and prolonged tender makes it
less likely that the shares will sell at bargain prices. 54 Finally, the bidder's
expenses are increased. It does not appear, however, that state takeover laws
have significantly reduced the number of tenders made.
During the period from 1970 through 1974, a relatively small number of
tender offers were made.' 55 During this period, only a handful of state take-
over laws were in effect. During 1975 through 1979, the annual number of
152. See Rubin, Arbitrage, 32 Bus. LAW. 1315 (1977).
153. Vorys, Ohio Tender Ofers Bill, 43 OHIO BAR 65, 73 (1970).
154. See Flom, The Role of the Takeover t the American Economy, 32 Bus. LAW. 1299 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Flom].
155. Ruth Appleton, Esq., Chief of the Office of Tender Offers and Acquisitions of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, has provided the following information regarding the
number of tender offers made during the period from 1969 through 1979. Note that the infor-
mation set forth below refers to the SEC fiscal year, which runs from October 1 through Sep-
tember 30.
Year No. of Tender Offer Filings
1969











Most of the principal, commercial states adopted tender offer laws during 1975 and there-
after. During this period, the number of tender offers made has significantly increased. See
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tender offers has generally increased. 156  During the period from 1975
through 1977, tender offer laws became effective in twenty-seven additional
states. 157 Although it is impossible to tell how many tender offers were dis-
couraged by these laws, it does not appear that the enactment of such laws
during 1975-1977 by almost all the major, commercial states (California, ac-
cording to form, being the lone rebel) has dramatically affected the number
of tender offers made.
3. Local Benefits
A. Pseudo-Foreign Corporaton Laws.
The internal affairs doctrine permits corporations to avoid regulation
by the law of the state of commercial domicile by incorporating or reincor-
porating elsewhere. 5 ' With pseudo-foreign corporation laws, states can re-
tain regulatory control over corporations commercially domiciled there, if
the state so desires. This is not an insignificant benefit. The state of com-
mercial domicile obviously has an interest in the financial stability of corpo-
rations domiciled there, both to protect resident shareholders and creditors
of the corporation. Further, such a state would have an interest in promul-
gating the standard of care which should be exercised by directors and of-
ficers of corporations and standards for indemnification of officers and
directors of commercially domiciled corporations.
Perhaps most important, states have an interest in protecting resident
shareholders from fraudulent or unfair practices. For example, the recent
drop in stock prices has made more companies consider the advisability of
attempting to "go private." Different states have taken different approaches
to regulating procedures for going private. Many states have done nothing
(generally relying upon the fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders and
management to other shareholders), while other states, such as California,
have adopted more restrictive protective legislation. 159 Indeed, states have
generally Mishkin and Nathan, Tender Offers Continue to Surge, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1977, at 30, col.
1.
Professor Douglas Austin of the University of Toledo is preparing information regarding
tender offers made during 1978 and 1979. He is compiling this information during the winter of
1979 and it will be published in 1980. (Correspondence on file with author.)
Professor Austin has stated that from 1970 through 1975 an aggregate of 269 tender offers
were made. See Austin, Stud Reveals Trends i Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Offers, supra note
146, at 25. This difference between his figures and the figures supplied by the Securities and
Exchange Commission could result from the fact that the SEC figures are compiled on the basis
of its fiscal year (from October 1 through September 30), while Professor Austin's information is
presumably compiled on a calendar year basis.
156. See Austin, Study Reveals Trends in Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Offers, supra note 146.
See also information supplied by Ruth Appleton, supra note 155.
157. During this period takeover laws became effective in Indiana, Delaware, Connecticut,
New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Texas, and New Jersey, among
others.
158. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
159. California Corporations Code § 1101 provides that in connection with any merger
other than a short-form merger, the common shares of a disappearing corporation may be con-
verted only into common shares of the surviving corporation unless all shareholders of the disap-
pearing corporation approve another plan. Similarly, in connection with a sale of assets
transaction, if the buyer controls the seller, the terms of the sale must be approved by at least
19801
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
an interest in protecting shareholder rights in connection with any corporate
reorganization, if a large percentage of its shareholders reside in the state.
The benefit derived from pseudo-foreign corporation laws, therefore, is
that the state of commercial domicile retains the right to regulate the inter-
nal affairs of corporations commercially domiciled there, to the extent, if
any, that the state desires to do so to protect shareholders and creditors resid-
ing there.
B. Benefits Dertved from Stale Takeover Laws.
Given that the primary effect of state takeover laws is to delay the com-
mencement of a tender offer and to prolong the tender offer once it has com-
menced,' 6° the bidder rarely acquires the target company shares for the
price originally bid. A third party frequently enters the fray and competes
with the original bidder for the shares of the target company. 161 Therefore,
one effect of state takeover laws seems to be that bidders are not able to get
the bargain they had been able to obtain under the quicker "Saturday night
special" tender offer permitted under the Williams Act. 162 (Alternatively,
one could argue that bidders now bid a lower initial price in anticipation of
the bidding to follow.)
90% of the seller's outstanding shares, unless the shareholders of the seller receive common
shares of the buyer in connection with the sale. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1001(d) (West 1977).
160. See, e.g., Flom, supra note 154.
161. See Steinbrink, supra note 146, at 894 n.42; Austin, Study Reveals Trends in Tactics, Premi-
uns, Success Rates in Ofers, supra note 146. See, e.g., Auerbach, Pertec Suitors Agree to Settle Takeover
Battle, L.A. Times, Nov. 21, 1979, Part III, at 10, col. 4; Takeover Talks Held by Buckeye Interna-
tional, Inc., Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1979, page 14, col. 2; Posner's Victorv in a Btdding War, NEws-
WEEK, Dec. 10, 1979, at 97.
An example of such a bidding war in which target shareholders received a large premium
for their shares was the contest between United Technologies and J. Ray McDermott for con-
trol of Babcock & Wilcox Company. At the time the tender was announced, the market price of
the shares was $35. United Technologies originally bid $42 for the shares. McDermott was
eventually successful with an offer of $65 per share. See Metz, Babcock and Wilcox: A Battle That
Shook Wall Street Notins, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1977, at 57, col. 1.
Similarly, Dominion Bridge and Bendix battled for control of Warner & Swasey. When
Dominion Bridge initially announced its proposed offer of $57 per share, Warner & Swasey's
stock was trading for $36-%. The final successful bid by Bendix was $83 per share.
162. See, e.g., Flom, supra note 154; Brown, Changes in Offeror Strategy, 28 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 843, 848 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brown]. See generally Ehrbar, Corporate Takeovers Are
Here to Stay, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 91; Bus. WEEK, Nov. 14, 1977, at 184.
Professor Austin's studies suggest that tender offer premiums are currently not significantly
higher than premiums received by target shareholders a decade ago. He notes that during the
period from 1968 through 1972, a "majority" of the premiums contained in tender offers
amounted to less than 50% of the market price of the shares two weeks prior to the tender offer.
See Austin, Study Reveals Trends in Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Offers, supra note 146. Al-
though the premiums received by shareholders during 1972 through 1975 increased somewhat,
during the 1976-1977 period 71.6% of the tender offers studied offered target shareholders pre-
miums of less than 50% of the market price of the shares. These figures do not distinguish
between contested and uncontested tender offers, however. It could be true that premiums
currently received by shareholders in uncontested tender offers are not significantly higher than
those received a decade ago, but that shareholders now receive greater premiums in a contested
offer or when two bidders are fighting for control of a target company.
A.F. Ehrbar disagrees with the findings of Professor Austin and contends that tender offer
premiums were then averaging more than 60% over market price, and in contested tender offers
the premiums were greater. Ehrbar notes that the premium target shareholders have histori-
cally received in tender offers is approximately 25%.
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Another related local benefit stemming from state takeover laws is the
additional time given shareholders to decide whether to tender their shares.
This results both from the waiting period (during which a tender has been
announced but has not commenced) and from the longer hold-open period
required, coupled with the increased withdrawal rights and pro rata takeup
protection given target company shareholders. Since the recent SEC propos-
als regarding tender offer regulation would lengthen the required hold-open
period and would extend withdrawal rights and pro rata takeup protection
beyond that currently provided in the Williams Act, this suggests that these
measures are now seen as a more desirable regulatory scheme.'
63
4. Less Restrictive Alternatives
A. Pseudo-Foreign Corporatzon Laws.
It does not appear that there is an alternative to pseudo-foreign corpo-
ration laws which would be less burdensome on interstate commerce while
still affirming a state's right to regulate commercially domiciled corpora-
tions. The foreign corporation could be required to have seventy to ninety
percent of its contacts with the state before the pseudo-foreign corporation
law would apply. This change would result in such laws applying to fewer
corporations and to corporations with generally fewer national contacts;
while placing less of a burden on interstate commerce, this would also sub-
stantially erode a state's ability to regulate commercially domiciled corpora-
tions.
B. State Takeover Laws.
In sum, the principal benefit accruing from state takeover laws seems to
be a prolongation of tender offers, resulting from the required waiting pe-
riod, the expanded withdrawals rights, the pro rata takeup provisions, and
the extended mandatory hold-open period. One significant burden upon
commerce is that tender offers now must be announced in advance of the
tender rather than concurrently with the commencement of the tender, as
the Williams Act permitted. The waiting period provisions permit target
management to engage in defensive tactics and give third parties additional
notice of the tender, affording them time to consider whether they also wish
to bid for the target shares.
It appears that whatever benefit is derived from the waiting period is
outweighed by the resulting burden upon commerce. The advantages of the
waiting period could essentially be retained by prolonging the hold-open pe-
riod and lengthening pro rata purchase rights and withdrawal rights. Under
such a regulatory scheme, shareholders would still have a significant period
of time to consider whether they wish to tender their shares and manage-
ment would not have an opportunity to engage in defensive tactics prior to
the commencement of a tender. For these reasons, it seems that state law
163. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,548, [19791 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,935 [hereinafter cited as Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,548]; see also Federal Regu-
lation of Securities Committee, State Takeover Statutes and the WitThams Act, A Report of the Subcom-
mittee on Proxy Sohttattwns and Tender Oers, 32 Bus. LAW. 187, 189 (1976).
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waiting period provisions should be deemed an impermissible burden upon
interstate commerce.
A similar conclusion should be reached regarding the provisions of state
laws which provide for hearings by the state securities commission. These
hearings probably do benefit shareholders by attempting to insure full and
accurate disclosure. Target management uses these hearings, however, as a
significant defensive tool. Many state statutes provide that hearings must be
held upon request by target management. Since the tender may not com-
mence until all hearings have been completed, target management almost
always requests hearings, often in more than one state. Consequently, the
commencement of tender offers could be delayed for months, thereby sub-
stantially increasing the costs to the bidder and making it more likely that a
third-party bidder will enter the scene. ' 64 Because these hearing procedures
substantially delay the commencement of a tender offer after its announce-
ment, and because the essential benefits of the state laws would continue
without such provisions, they should be deemed impermissible burdens upon
interstate commerce. The primary benefit of state takeover laws-the pro-
longation of the period during which shareholders may decide whether to
tender their shares-may be retained without providing for hearings by the
state securities commissions.
164. For example, United Technologies Corporation initially announced on April 5, 1977,
its intention to tender for the shares of Babcock & Wilcox at a price of $42 a share, with the
tender to commence as soon as all state law requirements had been satisfied. Babcock & Wilcox
then requested hearings under the takeover laws of four different states. Because of these ma-
neuvers by target management, United Technologies was not able to have the tender commence
until August 4, 1977; the initial tender price was then $48. A third-party bidder appeared on
the scene and was successful. See generaly Brown, supra note 162, at 844-45.
Another example of the burdens imposed by the state law hearing requirements can be
seen in the attempted tender offer by Thrall Car Manufacturing Company for the shares of
Youngstown Steel Door Company. On May 24, 1976, Thrall Car announced its intention to
tender for Youngstown Steel shares at a price of $14 a share. The management of Youngstown
Steel requested a hearing pursuant to the state takeover law. These hearings were held from
June 25 through July 16, 1976. The commission issued its order on August 2, 1976. When one
reads this order, it appears that the Ohio Securities Commission was attempting to insure that
state takeover laws would be deemed unconstitutional. The division found the disclosure docu-
ment inadequate in many ways. Among other things, the division wanted Thrall Car to disclose
a great amount of information regarding the business of Youngstown Steel. This information
seemingly could only have been obtained from Youngstown Steel management, who did not
appear amenable to such cooperation, to say the least. More importantly, the division found
both the price offered target shareholders too low and the hold-open period of the offer too
short. As if this was not enough to frustrate Thrall Car, the division announced that any
amended offer and the accompanying disclosure document would first be forwarded to Youngs-
town Steel management for their comments, and then the offer and disclosure document would
be again reviewed by the commission. A third-party bidder appeared that was supported by
Youngstown Steel management; this third-party bidder was able to avail itself of the "friendly
offer" exemption of the Ohio takeover law. The bidder was therefore able to tender successfully
for the shares of Youngstown Steel while Thrall Car could not make a tender offer, since it had
not complied with the state statute. See Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 223-25.
A recent case considered the constitutionality of the Ohio takeover law. The court found
that the Ohio law did not impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, that the
Ohio law did not conflict with the federal law, and that the Williams Act did not intend to
preempt the field of regulation of tender offers. AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929
(S.D. Ohio (1979).
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5. Balancing the Benefits and Burdens
A. Pseudo-Foreign Corporatton Laws.
It was argued above that pseudo-foreign corporation laws could ad-
vance significant state policies, but their enforcement could also result in
substantial burdens upon interstate commerce. The commerce clause bal-
ance in some circumstances will not be an easy one.
The burdens upon interstate commerce resulting from pseudo-foreign
corporation laws hopefully will ebb as the pseudo-foreign corporation excep-
tion to the internal affairs doctrine becomes more established, which should
occur if a number of states adopt pseudo-foreign corporation laws. Most
civil law countries apply the law of the country in which the corporation's
"social seat" is located to internal affairs questions; no significant burden on
commerce appears to result.16 5 The burdens upon interstate commerce im-
posed by such laws, therefore, seem largely to be a transitory phenomenon.
State regulations which are aimed at restraining fraudulent or unfair
trade practices seem more likely to survive commerce clause review than
those oriented toward increasing the profitability of local business.
166
Pseudo-foreign corporation laws seem clearly to be of the former type.
Because the commercial burden hopefully will gradually diminish, and
because these laws do not represent an attempt by a state to favor local
business vis-a-vis out of state enterprise, these laws should be allowed to sur-
vive commerce clause challenge. Of course, if the burden is substantial, it
may be necessary to deem such laws unconstitutional as applied in certain
situations.
B. State Takeover Laws.
As noted, both the waiting period provisions of state takeover laws and
the provisions allowing hearings by state securities commissions should be
held impermissible burdens upon interstate commerce, since the benefits of
state takeover laws could be retained while these significant burdens upon
interstate commerce could be eliminated. The question remains, however,
whether state takeover laws without these provisions should be deemed im-
permissible burdens upon interstate commerce.
A number of judges and commentators have noted that state takeover
laws were essentially special interest legislation designed to protect manage-
ment of local target companies; 167 however, this should not be considered
determinative. Although the Supreme Court has sometimes focused upon
an improper legislative purpose or motive in connection with the enactment
of legislation as a justification for deeming the statute unconstitutional, in
165. See note 107 supra.
166. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 340 (1978). The constitutionality of
§ 2115 of the California Corporations Code was considered in a recent student note. See Note,
California's Statutory Attempt to Regulate Foreign Corporations.- Witl it Surove the Commerce Clause?, 16
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 943 (1979).
167. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420, 437 (N.D. Tex. 1977);
Bartell, The Wtsconsin Takeover Statute, 32 Bus. LAW. 1465, 1466 (1977); Buford, The Virginia
Takeover Statute, 32 Bus. LAW. 1469 (1977).
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most instances the Supreme Court does not deem legislative purposes signifi-
cant. 168 The commerce clause determination should be based upon the ef-
fect of these laws and not on an attempt to generalize the motivations of the
legislatures of more than two-thirds of the states.
The extent of the burden imposed upon interstate commerce by state
takeover laws would depend upon whether state takeover laws would be
deemed analogous to internal affairs questions and thus be governed by only
the law of one state. ' 6 9 If this view would be accepted, only one state take-
over law would apply to any takeover. If not accepted, it is quite possible
that two or more state takeover laws could regulate a tender. Additional
hindrances upon interstate commerce would result from the conflicting re-
quirements.
Assuming that a tender offer is not an internal affairs matter, tender
offers could be regulated in the same manner that securities transactions are
generally regulated by blue sky laws. Accordingly, state takeover laws would
not be extraterritorial and would only govern offers made to resident share-
holders. Such an approach would be an improvement upon the current ex-
traterritorial laws which base jurisdiction upon any substantial (sometimes
even a minimal) contact with the state. It is submitted that such an analysis,
however, fails to consider the distinction between a tender offer and a nor-
mal offering of securities. In a normal public offering of securities, securities
are being offered by the company to the general public. If for some reason a
state blue sky law is deemed too restrictive or the offer would not qualify in
that state, no significant problem results; offers are made only in the states
where the applicable blue sky laws are satisfied. As a result, the only burden
upon interstate commerce is that the shares may not be offered to residents
of states with restrictive laws.
In contrast, a tender offer is made to a specific group of people---ex-
isting shareholders. In addition, it is a complex transaction with a number
of important substantive terms and rights (such as the hold-open period,
withdrawal rights, and pro rata repurchase rights) provided to the target
shareholder. The regulation of a tender offer by all states in which target
shareholders reside would obviously result in different shareholders being
treated differently (e.g., the tender would remain open in some states longer
than in others). Most importantly, if a state enacted a restrictive takeover
law, or if only a few shareholders resided in the state, a bidder might choose
to ignore such states and merely bid for shares in states where a larger
number of shareholders reside or which have less restrictive takeover laws. 7 0
The undesirable result is that certain shareholders are not able to take ad-
168. Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) wih Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976) and Baldwin v. GAF Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). See generally
Note, supra note 108, at 896.
169. See notes 244-51 zn/fa and accompanying text.
170. Arkansas purports to regulate all tender offers made regarding target companies with
more than 35 Arkansas shareholders. Offerors have attempted to avoid compliance with the
Arkansas statute by excluding Arkansas residents from the offer. See genera(y I M. LIPrON & E.
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 244-45 (1978). Such a tactic would appear to
violate the terms of the New York Stock Exchange Company Manual. Id. at 225.
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vantage of the full premium offered in the tender offer.' 7 1 Because of these
factors, it seems more desirable to have one extraterritorial tender offer law
govern a tender offer rather than different state takeover laws.
Regulating tender offers made to shareholders residing outside the state
does not result in any local benefit to the regulating state. This in no way
differs from the extraterritoriality of state regulation of corporate internal
affairs; such regulation almost always has some extraterritorial effects, but
has never been considered impermissible for that reason. It will be argued
below that a tender offer should be considered an internal affairs matter,
hence justifying the extraterritoriality of the tender offer laws.
If the waiting period provisions and the provisions permitting hearings
by state securities commissions are deleted from state takeover laws, the bur-
den upon interstate commerce would diminish. The following significant
burdens remain: disclosure requirements exceeding those of federal law, dif-
ferent hold-open periods, pro rata repurchase, and withdrawal rights.
The additional state disclosure requirements do not seem to create a
constitutional problem. 172 State blue sky laws frequently impose disclosure
requirements in addition to those required by the SEC, and it is accepted
that state blue sky laws are constitutional. No disclosures required by state
law are prohibited by federal law.
The longer hold-open period (coupled with prolonged withdrawal
rights) of state statutes, however, would burden interstate commerce. These
provisions give target shareholders more time to decide whether to tender
their shares, and consequently give a third-party bidder additional time to
decide whether to bid for the shares. Although such provisions have not
significantly reduced the number of tender offers, such provisions clearly
could have a "chilling effect" upon tender offers.
Apparently, the SEC has concluded that it would be wise to lengthen
the hold-open period and withdrawal rights prescribed under the Williams
Act. 17 3 These proposals would extend withdrawal rights until the expiration
of fifteen business days from the commencement of the offer (proposed rule
14d-7) and they would require a tender offer to remain open at least thirty
business days from the commencement of an offer (proposed rule 14e-1).
This suggests that the SEC has concluded that the benefits accruing to target
shareholders from such extensions would exceed any burdens upon com-
merce which would result. It is submitted that state hold-open periods and
withdrawal rights which are longer than those prescribed under the Wil-
liams Act should be deemed constitutional, unless the period is clearly exces-
sive.
171. Unless trading of the shares of the target company would be suspended, shareholders
would be able to sell shares on the open market. The market price in such instances, however,
often is significantly less than the tender price.
172. Accord, Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1281-87 (5th Cir. 1978).
Under federal law, a Schedule 14D-I must be filed in connection with a tender offer. 17
C.F.R. § 240. 14d-100. Various states have different disclosure requirements. See generally
Gould & Jacobs, The Practical E ects of State Tender Ofer Legislation, 23 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 399, 410
(1978).
173. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,548, supra note 163.
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Lengthened pro rata repurchase rights also place a burden upon the
tender offer. To satisfy the pro rata repurchase rights of both the Williams
Act and state law, the bidder would need to buy more shares than required.
In light of the benefits which accrue to shareholders from giving them a
significant period of time to decide whether to tender their shares, however,
such prolonged pro rata repurchase rights should be deemed constitutional.
State regulation of securities transactions and corporate internal affairs
has generally not been considered an impermissible burden upon commerce.
State takeover laws (without a waiting period and without provisions for an
administrative hearing) should satisfy a commerce clause review. 174
D. Preemption
A question exists whether state regulation of tender offers has been pre-
empted by the Williams Act.' 75 A state statute normally is preempted if the
federal law (or the legislative history of that law) clearly reflects the inten-
tion of Congress that state regulation of the subject matter should not be
allowed.176 Even if the federal law does not expressly preempt state regula-
tion, sometimes an intention to preempt will be inferred if (i) the federal
174. Accord, AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979); City Investing
Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Ind. 1979). Quite another question is presented by a city
and not a state enacting a takeover law. Such a law was enacted by Urbana, New York. See
Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 254 n.103. It is extremely doubtful that such a law would be
constitutional.
Certain state takeover laws have unusual provisions which appear to impermissibly burden
interstate commerce. For example, Hawaii's law requires that a bidder offer to purchase 100%
of the target shares (see HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-2(3) (1976); a bidder may not specify that it
will only bid for a certain lower percentage of the shares. This significantly burdens interstate
commerce, since tender offers frequently are made for less than 100% of the shares; the cost of
buying all or nearly all of the outstanding shares may be prohibitive. The benefit is that all
shareholders wishing to tender may obtain the premium for all shares tendered, rather than the
pro rata take-up which would normally occur. The burden on interstate commerce resulting
from such a provision clearly seems to exceed its benefits.
Kansas has enacted a provision which provides that if a person acquires 2% of a company's
stock without disclosing an intention to "influence control of the target company" or without
making the appropriate filing with the state securities commission, a tender offer may not be
made for one year. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1277(b) (1975). For similar statutes, see GA. CODE
§ 22-1904 (1977); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(b)(2) (Anderson 1978). It is unclear what
local benefit is derived from these provisions, other than making sure that target management is
notified at an early date of an intended tender offer. The burdens imposed by the provision are
significant; if a person has purchased shares at some point when it did not have an intention to
make a tender offer or for whatever other reason the provision was not satisfied, a tender offer
cannot be made until the expiration of the one-year period. (In one instance, the Ohio Securi-
ties Commissioner concluded that the Ohio provision only applied if the purchaser had an
intention to seek control of the target company at the time the purchaser bought the shares. I
M. LIPrON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 251 (1978)). In addition, the
provision represents an additional means of alerting target management of an intended tender
offer. Since the benefits are minimal and the burden significant, such a provision should not
withstand a commerce clause review. (It should be noted that the SEC's proposed rule 14e-2
contains a somewhat similar requirement regarding disclosure of an intention to make a tender
offer.)
After this article was prepared, the SEC adopted amendments to its tender offer rules. See
note 193, infa. If it is determined that such rules are enforceable, these new rules would signifi-
cantly alter the commerce clause balance set forth herein.
175. The doctrine of preemption is derived from the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2.
176. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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regulation of the subject matter is so pervasive that it leaves no room for
state supplementation; 77 (ii) the federal interest in the subject matter is so
dominant that the states must be precluded from enacting laws on that sub-
ject;' 78 or (iii) the need for uniform national regulation is so great that state
regulation cannot be tolerated. ' 79 Even if an intent to preempt state regula-
tion is not expressly evident and cannot be inferred, a state law still may be
preempted if it directly conflicts with the substantive requirements of the
federal law and it is impossible to comply with both laws' 80 or if the state
law undermines the purposes and objectives of the federal law. '8'
The three types of preemption outlined above have been referred to as
express, implicit, and operational preemption.
1. Express Preemption
The Williams Act contains no language from which one could conclude
that Congress intended to preempt the field of regulation of tender offers.
Indeed, the Williams Act was codified in the Securities Act of 1934, which
Act contains a savings clause allowing states to enact similar laws provided
they do not conflict with federal law.1
8 2
2. Implicit Preemption
There has been some debate regarding whether the Williams Act consti-
tutes a sufficiently comprehensive or pervasive federal scheme so that an in-
tent to preempt could be inferred.' 3 An important consideration is that
state and federal governments traditionally have concurrently regulated se-
curities transactions.'8 4 In addition, Virginia had adopted its takeover law
before Congress enacted the Williams Act, and the continuing effectiveness
of this state law was not addressed in the Williams Act. Of course, a number
of states have subsequently adopted state takeover laws. The Williams Act
has been amended during this period and no mention has been made of an
intention to preempt. Similarly, the proposed new federal securities law ex-
177. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). Sometimes, however, even where there was extensive fed-
eral regulation, no intention to preempt was found. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976);
Head v. Board of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
178. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (national security); Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (foreign affairs).
179. See Evansville Vanderburg Airport Auth. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 720-21
(1972); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297,300 (1961). See generall Hirsch, Towarda New View of
Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515 [hereinafter cited as Hirsch].
180. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Kelley v. Washington, 301 U.S. I
(1937).
181. See, e.g., Jones v. General Mills, 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Lodge 76, International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Perez v. Camp-
bell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
182. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976). This savings clause should not be given a great deal of
weight, however, since it was enacted decades before the enactment of the Williams Act or state
takeover laws.
183. See Note, supra note 108.
184. For example, it has been said that "under the [federal] securities laws state regulation
may co-exist with that offered under the federal securities law. ... SEC v. National Sec.,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 461 (1969).
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pressly permits state regulation of tenders if the corporation has a certain
level of contacts with the state. 185 Accordingly, it seems that state takeover
legislation should not be deemed impliedly preempted by the Williams Act.
The Supreme Court cases in which the federal interest in the subject
matter has been so dominant that the states have been barred from enforc-
ing their laws have generally been limited to foreign affairs and national
security. 186 Therefore, it does not appear that the federal interest in regulat-
ing tender offers is so dominant that state regulation of the field must be
precluded.
On the other hand, one may view uniform national regulation of the
securities area as necessary.18 7 This argument, however, has not been well
received in the United States; state regulation of securities transactions has
generally been deemed constitutional.' 8 8
A related point is that tender offer regulation could be treated as an
internal affairs matter and not as an "issuance of securities." State regula-
tion of corporate internal affairs has generally been constitutionally sanc-
tioned. 189
There is a more basic reason why uniform national regulation of tender
offers is not necessary. Valuable information has been learned from the state
regulation: prolonging the tender offer period (while giving target share-
holders certain prophylactic rights during that period) benefits target share-
holders and does not appear to put a significant burden upon interstate
commerce. Because much has and will be learned from state tender offer
regulation, state tender offer regulation should be preempted only to the
extent that it conflicts with or undermines the objectives of the federal law.
3. Operational Preemption
Of course, a state law is preempted if it conflicts with the federal law
and it is impossible to comply with both. 190 State takeover laws frequently
185. Under the proposed new federal securities law, states could regulate tenders if 50% of
the corporation's shareholders lived in the state and the corporation's principal place of business
was there. See Bartell, Federal-State Relations Under the Federal Securities Code, 32 VAND. L. REV.
457, 480 (1979).
186. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (foreign affairs); Pennsylvania v. Nel-
son, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (national security); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (foreign
affairs). In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), the Supreme Court noted the
strong federal interest in regulating the design of tankers used in foreign commerce.
187. See, e.g., I L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 102 (2d ed. 1961).
188. See, e.g., Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917). Of course, it could be argued
that the regulation of tender offers is somehow different from the regulation of other types of
securities transactions and that states should not be able to regulate them.
189. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
190. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663
(1962). In addition to an actual and resolvable conflict, the Supreme Court has sometimes
suggested that the posstbility of states enacting legislation conflicting with federal legislation is
sufficient to deem state law preempted. See generally Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151
(1978); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973); accord, Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960). The holdings of the Atlantic
Richfitld and Burbank cases, however, were principally based upon the fact that a pervasive
federal scheme was in effect and preemption was thus required.
Even if a state statute has conflicted with the federal statute and the conflict was not resolv-
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set forth substantive provisions that are different from those set forth in the
Williams Act.' 9 ' For example, the pro rata repurchase rights, withdrawal
rights, hold-open periods, disclosure requirements, and waiting periods in
the various state takeover laws frequently vary from those in the Williams
Act.19 2 It is possible, however, to comply with both the state and federal
provisions:193 if more shares are tendered than desired, the pro rata repur-
chase requirements of the Williams Act can be satisfied as to target company
shareholders who tender within the first ten days; then, another computation
could be made under the applicable state law as to shares tendered after the
tenth day but within the period during which target company shareholders
are given pro rata repurchase rights under state law. The bidder would need
to buy more target shares than desired, but both state and federal require-
ments would be satisfied.'
9 4
able, the Supreme Court has ruled that the state law will only be preempted if it undermines
the purposes of the federal law. See Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414
U.S. 117, 134-40 (1973).
191. For a general discussion of the state takeover laws and the Williams Act, see notes 218-
51 ,nfra and accompanying text.
192. See notes 218-43 btfra and accompanying text.
193. It should be noted, however, that certain rules proposed by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission could result in an irreconcilable conflict between state and federal rules.
Proposed rule 14e-l, 44 FED. REG. (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240) provides, among
other things, that tender offers must remain open for at least 30 busihess days. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 15,548, supra note 163. Under proposed rule 14e-l, it could be im-
possible to satisfy this requirement as well as the requirements of some state takeover laws that
tender offers remain open no longer than 35 days.
Some commentators argue that state law deviations from federally mandated pro rata re-
purchase obligations and withdrawal rights should be preempted. See Tender Offers, supra note
113, at 226-29.
After this article was prepared, the SEC adopted amendments to its tender offer rules. The
new rules provide that shareholders of a target company should be able to withdraw tendered
shares until 15 business days have elapsed from the commencement of the offer. New rule 14e-1
now requires that a tender offer must remain open for a minimum of 20 business days. A bidder
is permitted, under rule 14d-8, to extend the pro rata repurchase period beyond the 10-day
period set forth in the Williams Act.
The most significant new provision is rule 14-d-2(b). This requires a bidder, within five
days after the material terms of a proposed tender have been publically announced, to (i) file a
schedule 14D-1 with the SEC and (ii) transmit to the shareholders of the target company a
disclosure document which contains a summary of the material terms of the offer. The Release
states that "Rule 14d-2 is intended to prevent public announcements by a bidder of the mate-
rial terms of its tender offer in advance of the offer's final commencement." See SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA), No. 531, at E-5 (Dec. 15, 1979). This directly conflicts with state takeover laws
which require waiting periods between the announcement and commencement of tender offers.
This provision also states that an offer generally will be deemed to commence the date
upon which the material terms of a proposed offer are made public. This is substantially differ-
ent from when an offer may be deemed to have commenced under state law, thereby making it
more difficult to comply with both federal and state pro rata repurchase requirements and
withdrawal rights.
In addition, the SEC has taken the position that setting forth the material terms of a pro-
posed tender offer in a document filed with a state securities commission constitutes a public
announcement of the tender offer. SEC brief in H.B. Holdings v. Rosario Resources Corp.
(S.D.N.Y.) No. 80 Civ. 0201 (CLB) Uan. 14, 1980).
If it is determined that these rules adopted by the SEC (and the state law waiting period
and administrative hearing provisions) are enforceable, it may be impossible to comply with
both the state and federal provisions, thereby significantly changing the preemption discussion
set forth herein. The Ohio Division of Securities has challenged the authority of the SEC to
adopt these new rules in Ohio v. SEC, CA 2-80-111 (S.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 15, 1980).
194. Accord, Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 226-29.
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Similarly, if state law granted shareholders withdrawal rights for a
longer period than that set forth in the Williams Act, the bidder would
merely honor the state's longer withdrawal right period to satisfy both the
state and federal law requirements. This could, however, undermine the
federally created right of the bidder which provides that tenders become
irrevocable the eighth day after the tender commences.' 9
5 Nevertheless, the
longer withdrawal rights provided by state law seem to be designed to afford
unsophisticated shareholders additional time to decide whether to tender
shares. Thus, this provision is intended to protect target shareholders and it
supports-rather than undermines-the purpose of the Williams Act. Since
the state withdrawal rights advance the general purpose of the Williams Act,
and since it is possible to comply with both federal and state withdrawal
rights, the state provisions should not be preempted.
The Supreme Court has been solicitous of the state interest in regulat-
ing securities transactions. In Merr'll, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v.
Ware,19 6 the Court upheld a state statute which conflicted with the require-
ments of the New York Stock Exchange Rules (which were promulgated
pursuant to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act). 19 7 The Court decided that it
was unnecessary to hold the state law preempted to advance the policy of the
1934 Act.1 98 Because currently there is no irreconcilable conflict between
state and federal takeover laws, and because states historically have been
given the right to regulate securities transactions concurrently with the fed-
eral securities laws, it is submitted that state takeover laws should not be
preempted by federal law.
The most difficult preemption question is whether the state laws are
preempted by the federal law because they frustrate the objectives of the
Williams Act. The analysis is confounded because these objectives are less
than clear. One purpose of the Williams Act clearly is to protect sharehold-
ers of the target company. '99 A question that remains is whether the Wil-
liams Act is designed to balance the equities between target management
and the tender offeror. Certain statements found in the legislative history
suggest that such a balance was attempted. On the basis of this legislative
history, the circuit court in Great Western held that a purpose of the Williams
Act was to establish such a balance between target management and the
tender offeror, and that the state laws undermine this balance and therefore
should be preempted.
2 ° °
195. See Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 227.
196. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
197. Id at 139-40.
198. Id at 134-40. The Burger Court seems reluctant to hold that a state statute is pre-
empted. Compare New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) and
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) with Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) and
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). See generally Note, The Preemption
Doctrine- Shifting Prospecives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
The Burger Court has not handled preemption consistently; at times it seemed to strain to find
preemption. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
199. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
200. 577 F.2d at 1279-80.
Senator Williams noted, regarding the Williams Act, that "we have taken extreme care to
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Other commentators have argued that no such balance was struck. Pro-
ponents of this view note that the "Williams bill" as initially introduced by
Senator Williams was decidedly pro-target management and gradually was
amended to the form enacted as the Williams Act. Moreover, a number of
people who testified regarding the bill stated that its sole purpose was to
protect investors in target companies. 20 1 Similarly, the Supreme Court
found that the Williams Act reflects a "policy of neutrality in a contest for
control," but this policy "does not go . . .to the purpose of the legislation
. . . .Neutrality is, rather, but one characteristic of legislation directed to-
ward a different purpose-the protection of investors."
'20 2
It seems, therefore, that the purpose of the Williams Act is unclear.
This should not affect the determination whether state takeover laws are
operationally preempted by the Williams Act, however. If state waiting pe-
riod and administrative hearing provisions were stricken from state takeover
laws, these laws would not significantly undermine any balance struck by the
Williams Act between the interests of target management and tender offer-
ors. No notice of a tender offer would be required. Target management
would no longer be able to engage in defensive tactics prior to the com-
mencement of a tender offer. To satisfy state law it may be necessary to
disclose more information, to hold the offer open longer, or to give somewhat
different withdrawal rights to shareholders and pro rata repurchase protec-
tion than provided under the Williams Act. Such variances do not seem to
significantly erode any objectives of the Williams Act. 20 3 For this reason, if
the provisions of state law requiring a waiting period and permitting state
administrative hearings are deleted, state takeover laws should not be
deemed operationally preempted by the Williams Act because they under-
mine the Act's purposes.
Arguably, state takeover laws could be operationally preempted since
the state takeover laws take a "fiduciary approach" to tender offers while the
Williams Act reflects a "market approach. °20 4 The essence of this argument
seems to be that state law gives target management power to block a tender
offer, while federal law leaves the decision with the shareholders. The for-
mer belief stems from the fact that many state laws exempt tender offers
avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid." 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967). In addition, a Senate report on the bill stated
that "the committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in
favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. The bill is designed to
require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the
offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case .... " Senate Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency, Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownersh p in Corporate Takeover
Bids, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
201. See generally Note, supra note 108. As to the degree to which the Williams Bill was
amended before its enactment, compare S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) with S. 510, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
202. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
203. Great Western found that the degree of disclosure required under Idaho law undermined
the utility of federally mandated disclosure and was thereby preempted. 577 F.2d at 1281.




approved by target management. Absent such approval by target manage-
ment, state takeover requirements must be followed in most cases.
This "fiduciary approach-market approach" distinction seems to over-
estimate the club given target management under state laws. Target man-
agement is successful in retaining control in less than a majority of contested
tender offers.205 Admittedly, target management is given some power under
state takeover laws.20 6 If the waiting period and administrative hearing pro-
visions are deemed impermissible burdens upon commerce, however, the
power of target management would be reduced, thereby reducing the signifi-
cance of the "friendly offer" exemption.
Since in a contested tender offer target company shareholders still have
the opportunity to tender their shares, and since the power of target manage-
ment would be reduced if the waiting period and administrative hearing
provisions are deleted, state takeover laws in such form would not signifi-
cantly undermine any objective of, or any market approach reflected in, the
Williams Act and thus should not be deemed operationally preempted by
the Williams Act.
If there is no irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law, the
question of preemption is a policy decision.20 7 As a result of state takeover
laws, the longer hold-open periods (with longer pro rata repurchase and
withdrawal rights) benefit target shareholders and probably do not substan-
tially impede takeovers. Because such valuable knowledge can result from
the experimentation in state takeover regulation, such experimentation
should be allowed to continue.
The preceding discussion concludes that the application of the pseudo-
foreign corporation law of the commercial domicile of a pseudo-foreign cor-
poration to its internal affairs does not violate the due process clause, the full
faith and credit clause, or, in general, place an impermissible burden upon
interstate commerce. Indeed, full faith and credit should be deemed to re-
quire the application of such pseudo-foreign corporation laws. Different
types of such pseudo-foreign corporation laws will be considered below.
VI. PSEUDO-FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS
A. New York
New York law generally provides that certain provisions of the New
York corporation law 208 apply to foreign corporations that derive more than
one-half their total business income for the preceding three fiscal years from
205. See note 146 supra.
206. The probability of success of an uncontested tender offer appears to be much higher
than that of a contested one. Of the contested tender offers studied by Professor Austin during
the period from 1972 through 1977, approximately 93% of these offers were either partially or
completely successful. During the same period, only approximately 70% of contested tender
offers were partially or completely successful. See Austin, Study Reveals Trends bi Tater~s, Premiums,
Success Rates in Offers, supra note 146. Professor Austin does not note what percentage of the
"unsuccessful" contested tender offers represent instances in which a third party gained control
of the company.
207. See Hirsch, supra note 179, at 542-49.
208. See note 87 supra.
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New York.20 9 Certain problems arise from a statute which provides that it
governs a corporation immediately if a certain test relating to the income
derived from the state is satisfied. For example, the New York law governs a
foreign corporation beginning the first day of the fiscal year if, for the prior
three fiscal years, it has had more than one-half of its total business income
allocable to New York. The trouble with this formulation is that audited
financial statements often are not available until about ninety days after the
end of the fiscal year; it could be unclear for ninety days whether the corpo-
ration would be governed by the New York law. Similarly, it would be un-
clear for ninety days whether the corporation ceased to be governed by New
York law; this uncertainty would not be resolved until the audited financial
information was available.
Another problem with New York's regulatory scheme is that it only
considers one contact (business income) and it only requires that the corpo-
ration derive more than fifty percent of its business income from New York
to satisfy the statutory test. 210 A corporation could have more than fifty
percent of its shareholders, assets, and employees in another jurisdiction; it is
not clear that the New York law will only apply to corporations whose pri-
mary contact is with New York. It would appear advisable for such state
schemes to require the consideration of a number of factors. A state then
would be on firmer ground that it is indeed the one with the primary interest
in regulating the corporation.
Aside from the above, the New York statute does not clearly provide the
manner in which it regulates newly formed corporations. The law simply
states that it will govern those corporations which during the last three years
derived more than fifty percent of their income from New York. The ques-
tion is whether such newly formed corporations would be governed by the
state of incorporation for three years until they had such financial informa-
tion, or whether the New York law would apply sooner.
B. California
California law requires any foreign corporation transacting intrastate
business in California and any "foreign parent" corporation to file an of-
ficers' certificate with the California Secretary of State.21' This officers' cer-
tificate sets forth the percentage of the company's shareholders that reside in
California, the percentage of the company's sales made in California, the
property located in California, and the salaries paid to employees in Califor-
nia. The certificate must be filed within 105 days after the close of the com-
pany's fiscal year. If the officers' certificate indicates that over fifty percent
of the corporation's shareholders reside in California and that the average of
the corporation's payroll, property, and sales "factors" allocable to Califor-
nia exceed fifty percent, certain sections of California law apply to the corpo-
209. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1315-1320 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1979).
210. The bill as originally submitted to the New York legislature required either that 67% of
the corporation's revenue be generated from New York or that 67% of the shareholders resided
in New York. See Baraf, supra note 8, at 233.
211. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2108 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978).
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ration, beginning the first day of the next fiscal year.
2 12
The California provision avoids certain of the problems of the New
York provision discussed above. For example, it has a more workable time-
table for application. After the financial information has been computed
and the officers' certificate prepared, the corporation normally will have ap-
proximately eight months to plan its corporate activities while being aware
that certain California provisions will govern its activities during the upcom-
ing fiscal year. Conversely, the corporation will normally have eight months'
notice that the law will no longer apply. In addition, the California provi-
sion considers a number of different types of contacts between the corpora-
tion and California; this tends to insure that California will have the
predominate interest in regulating the company.
C. Model Provision
A certain time lag between the end of the fiscal year and the time at
which a pseudo-foreign corporation law would apply is necessary so that a
corporation can prepare its audited financial information and determine its
contacts with the state. A certain amount of additional lag time is necessary
so that a corporation may plan its corporate activities. A minimum of six
months lag time seems required, and the one year provided by the California
statute seems reasonable, since it coincides with a new fiscal year.
A number of commentators agree that such pseudo-foreign corporation
laws should apply to corporations with more than seventy to eighty percent
of its contacts with one state.21 3 The question remains whether such statutes
should apply to corporations with a lower level of state contacts. One could
argue that since such corporations have significant contacts with other states
they are more national in character and should not be governed. This does
not seem persuasive, however. If the pseudo-foreign corporation law consid-
ers a number of different contacts and the magnitude of the contacts be-
tween the corporation and the state averaged more than fifty percent, it
seems quite unlikely that any other state would have a greater interest in
regulating the affairs of the corporation. 2 14 It therefore seems more rational
212. Id. at § 2115. Section 2115(e) exempts from the scope of § 2115 corporations whose
shares are listed on the American or New York stock exchanges and corporations that are sub-
sidiaries of corporations not subject to § 2115. The exemption is unclear, however, regarding
the timing of this exemption. For example, would § 2115 govern a corporation during its next
fiscal year if, after it had filed the § 2108 officers' certificate which showed that the corporation
met the § 2115 tests (but before the beginning of the next fiscal year), the corporation either
listed its shares on the American or New York stock exchange or became a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of a corporation not governed by § 2115.
213. Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27, at 1329. See generally Kirgis, supra note 40, at 139-
42.
214. California law provides that any reorganization of a foreign or domestic corporation
must be qualified with the California Commissioner of Corporations if more than 25% of the
corporation's shareholders reside in California. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25103 (West 1977). To
qualify a transaction with the California Commissioner, the Commissioner must find that the
terms of the transaction are fair, just, and equitable. Accordingly, California purports to regu-
late offers made to all shareholders of a foreign corporation if 25% of those shareholders reside in
California.
This is an example of the troubling interface which exists between state blue sky regulation
and the internal affairs doctrine. While there is a general consensus that a state should not
[Vol. 57:3
REGULA TING THE REGULA TORS
to apply the law of the commercial domicile rather than the law of the state
of incorporation.
As noted above, the New York pseudo-foreign provision only considers
the percentage of the company's revenues generated in the state. While this
is a relevant factor, more types of contacts should be considered before a
corporation is deemed pseudo-foreign. California's jurisdictional provision is
a better example of a consideration of a number of relevant contacts. It
seems highly doubtful that a corporation that satisfies California's standard
could realistically be deemed commercially domiciled in any other state.
The pseudo-foreign corporation law should provide that the sections of the
state's corporation law which reflect important state policies will apply to
pseudo-foreign corporations. These sections should obviously be set forth in
the pseudo-foreign corporation law.
Both the California and New York statutory schemes exempt corpora-
tions with securities listed on the American or New York stock exchanges.
2 15
One argument advanced in support of this exemption is that these corpora-
tions are truly national companies. This seems to be a make-weight argu-
ment; under American law, the internal affairs of all corporations, even truly
national corporations, are governed by the corporate law of some state. Any
other considerations notwithstanding, it would appear more sensible to ap-
ply the law of the state of commercial domicile to national corporations
rather than the law of the state of incorporation.
The consideration which militates against this conclusion is that, cur-
rently, full faith and credit does not seem to require the application of the
law of the state of commercial domicile. Until such a rule evolves, even if
the state of commercial domicile has adopted a pseudo-foreign corporation
provision, it will be unclear whether pseudo-foreign corporations are gov-
erned by the law of the state of incorporation or the law of the commercial
domicile. Such uncertainty will place a burden on interstate commerce, and
the burden generally would be greatest regarding large national companies
with securities traded on national securities exchanges.2t 6 Hence, it would
generally regulate the internal affairs of a foreign corporation (unless the corporation is a
pseudo-foreign corporation), there is general agreement that states should have the power to
regulate securities transactions, at least insofar as they pertain to resident shareholders. In this
example, however, California does not merely purport to regulate offers made to California
shareholders but attempts to regulate the total transaction. Such an attempt to regulate the
total transaction, coupled with the California practice of reviewing the fairness of the terms of
the transaction, makes this blue sky regulation resemble an attempt to regulate the internal
affairs of foreign corporations.
One treatise argues that this California policy does not amount to an attempt to regulate
the internal affairs of pseudo-foreign corporations and is merely an exercise of California blue
sky jurisdiction. See generally 1 MARSH & VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURI-
TIES LAWS § 7.06 (1979). The commentators note that the specified minimum level of contacts
which require qualification in California is somewhat arbitrary.
It seems that the minimum level of contacts required by this California policy is much too
low. As a general rule, a state should not attempt to exercise primary jurisdiction over a reor-
ganization involving a foreign corporation unless the corporation has at least 50% of its contacts
(as somehow determined) with the regulating state.
215. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(e) (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1320 (Mc-
Kinney 1963).
216. The distinction between companies with shares listed on the American or New York
1980]
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
be wise to maintain such an exemption for such companies with listed securi-
ties, at least until such time, if ever, the proposed full faith and credit re-
quirements discussed above are accepted.
D. Recommendations
States should adopt pseudo-foreign corporation statutes such as the
model provision suggested above. If many states would enact such statutes,
a corporation could not easily evade the corporate law of its commercial
domicile merely by incorporating elsewhere. The upshot would be that
states could regulate corporations in the manner deemed optimal rather
than the manner deemed necessary to induce corporations to incorporate in
the state.
Since it is unclear whether states other than the commercial domicile
will apply pseudo-foreign corporation laws to questions pertaining to the in-
ternal affairs of pseudo-foreign corporations until the notion of pseudo-for-
eign corporation laws becomes accepted, some uncertainty will exist in
corporate choice of law regarding the law applicable to a pseudo-foreign
corporation. 21 7 One way of ameliorating this uncertainty would be to deter-
mine that full faith and credit would require the application of reasonable
pseudo-foreign corporation laws to questions pertaining to the internal af-
fairs of such corporations. Alternatively, states could include a choice of law
provision in their corporate codes stating that the internal affairs of all do-
mestic corporations would be governed by the state corporations code, unless
the corporation satisfied the jurisdictional test of a reasonable pseudo-foreign corporations
code of another state. It is not anticipated that pro-management states (e.g.,
Delaware) would be inclined to adopt this type of choice of law provision,
however.
stock exchanges and companies with shares traded on other exchanges or traded over-the-
counter is obviously somewhat arbitrary. It has been argued that the exemption from pseudo-
foreign corporation laws should be extended to such companies. For example, the initial Cali-
fornia draft of § 2115 did exempt such companies. Including such companies under the um-
brella of this exemption, however, would significantly increase the number of companies
exempted from the statutory scheme. It seems, therefore, that the line drawn between compa-
nies with shares listed on the New York and American stock exchanges and other companies is a
reasonable distinction and should be continued. Of course, the uncertainty regarding an inter-
nal affairs transaction of a company with shares listed on the American and New York stock
exchanges could cause a greater burden on commerce than uncertainty in internal affairs mat-
ters of other companies.
The distinction between companies with shares listed on the American and New York stock
exchanges and other companies with traded shares is one which also could be in violation of the
equal protection clause. This argument should fail, however, since there is a rational basis for
the distinction. Because it could reasonably be concluded that applying pseudo-foreign corpo-
ration laws to companies with shares listed on the American and New York exchanges would
cause a greater burden on interstate commerce than applying the laws to other companies, and
because courts have been increasingly reluctant to strike down economic statutes on the basis of
equal protection (see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); see generally Karst, lnvdi-
ous Discrtmtnaton. Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716, 720-25 (1969)), this distinction probably could withstand constitutional
attack.
217. Seegeneral4y Oldham, supra note 2, at 123-31.
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VII. STATE TENDER OFFER LAWS: MULTI-STATE REGULATION OF A
CORPORATE ACTIVITY
More than two-thirds of all the states have enacted takeover statutes in
some form. 21 8 These statutes contain some combination of the following
provisions: (i) certain information be disclosed to target company sharehold-
ers; (ii) a specified waiting period between the time a notice of intention is
filed with a state regulatory agency and the date upon which the offer can
become effective; (iii) specified minimum or maximum periods during which
the offer may remain effective; (iv) withdrawal rights which must be given to
tendering shareholders of target companies; (v) standards for state regulatory
review of the completeness of the disclosure documents and the fairness of
the transaction; (vi) the requirement that all target company shareholders
receive the highest price offered for the shares; and (vii) the requirement that
if more shares are tendered during a certain specified period than the offeror
desires to purchase, the offeror must purchase the shares on a pro rata basis
rather than on a first tendered, first purchased basis.
219
Various standards are set forth in the state takeover laws regarding
what type of contacts the target company must have with the state to have
the tender offer governed by the state takeover law. Most statutes provide
that if the target company is incorporated in the state, the tender offer will
be governed by the state takeover law;2 20 some statutes require a domestic
corporation to have some additional contact with the state, such as doing
business in the state, 22' before the state takeover law applies to a tender offer
for its shares.22 2 Other state laws govern tender offers for shares of a foreign
corporation if the foreign corporation has its principal place of business,
shareholders, 223 a certain number of employees, its principal executive of-
fices, 2 2 4 substantial assets, or does business in the state.
225
218. Seegenerally 2 TENDER OFFERS HANDBXK (J. Robinson ed. 1976).
219. See generaly Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 153.
220. See, e.g., DEL. CORP. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(2) (Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 78.3765 (1973); seegeneraly Note, supra note 108, at 881; Note, Securitles Law and the Constitution:
State Tender Ofer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 515 (1979); Comment, State Takeover
Statutes.- An Unconstitutional Approach.', 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 391, 404 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
221. E g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-1(5) (1976); VA. CODE § 13.1-5529(e) (1978 & Supp.
1979).
222. Eg., IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(6) (Supp. 1979) (substantial assets in state); MINN. STAT.
§ 80B.01(9) (West Supp. 1979) (substantial portion of assets in state); Wis. STAT. § 552.01(6)
(West Sp. Pam. 1979) (substantial assets in state).
223. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1264(5)(c), (6) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1979) (35 shareholders
in state); 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 55,671 (1979) (Tex. Blue Sky Reg. 065.15.00.200()).
224. See CONN. STAT. § 36-45 7(a) (West Supp. 1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-A:2(vi).
225. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-2-3.1-1-0) (Burns Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-2m
(West Supp. 1979); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1601(a) (West Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. STAT.
§ 1707.041(A)(1) (Page 1978); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 47-32-3 (Supp. 1979); see generaly
Langevoort, State Tender-Ofer Legislation: Interests, Ects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 213, 219-20 (1977).
For example, New York and Ohio law provides that the corporation must have its princi-
pal place of business and substantial assets in the state before the law applies, while Indiana and
New Jersey law provides that it applies to a corporation that has substantial assets in the state or
has its principal place of business there. The significance of this distinction is unclear.
One of the most aggressive of the state laws is the Utah takeover law, which applies to any
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One aspect of the state takeover laws which has caused a significant
amount of controversy is the fact that these laws are extraterritorial. The
statutes purport to govern offers made to shareholders, regardless of domi-
cile, if the tender offer falls within the jurisdictional limits of the statute.
226
The scope of such statutes is obviously more sweeping than normal state blue
sky laws, which are limited to offers made to shareholders who reside in the
state.
A number of state statutes also create a procedure whereby adequacy of
the disclosure or the fairness of the offer may be reviewed by the state securi-
ties commission, 227 either upon request of target company management
228
or at the discretion of the state securities commission. 229 The Williams Act
has no comparable provision.
It is also common for state laws to require that a notice of a tender offer
be filed with the state a certain number of days before the tender offer com-
mences. 230 The Williams Act has no such requirement.
23 1
The state takeover statutes provide certain exemptions; one frequently
foreign corporation with $25 million of its assets or 500 employees in the state. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 61-4-3(6) (1953).
226. See generally Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 153.
227. Id. at 217-20; see Comment, supra note 220, at 406. Certain states require a finding that
there is "fair, full, and effective disclosure" (see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (B)(1)(c)
(Page 1978), while others require a finding that the terms of the offer are "fair and equitable"
(see, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-3(g) (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-2(0 (Burns Supp.
1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 803.03(5) (West Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-4(a)(2) (West
Supp. 1979-80); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 552.05(5) (West Sp. Pam. 1979).
228. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-460 (West Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1501(E)
(West Supp. 1978); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 47-32-23 (Supp. 1979).
229. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-3( (1976).
230. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I10C, § 2 (West Supp. 1979) (30 days); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1(B)(1) (1978) (20 days); VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a) (Supp. 1978) (20
days); see generally Comment, supra note 220, at 405.
231. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (and the rules promul-
gated by the Federal Trade Commission regarding this Act) provide that the Federal Trade
Commission must be notified 30 days prior to the date of certain types of acquisitions (15 days
prior to the consummation of governed cash tender offers). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)
(1976); 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 333-97 (1978). The
rules for determining what types of cash tender offers are governed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act are somewhat complicated, but the Act generally governs a tender offer if (i) the bidder
acquires at least 15% of the shares of the target company or the aggregate value of the shares
purchased exceeds $15 million, and (ii) the bidder has total assets or annual net sales of at least
$100 million and the target company is engaged in manufacturing and has annual net sales or
total assets of at least $10 million, or the bidder has total assets or annual net sales of at least
5100 million and the target company has total assets of at least $10 million, or the bidder has
total assets or annual net sales of at least $10 million and the target company has total assets or
annual net sales of at least $100 million. Id at 348-49.
The rules promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission exempt tender offers in which
the bidder acquires 15% of the target company's shares, but the acquired shares will not have an
aggregate value exceeding 515 million and the bidder will not acquire 50% of the voting shares
of a target company with annual net sales or total assets of at least $10 million. Id. at 349-50.
This waiting period prescribed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act is really a period during
which the cash tender offer may not be consummated. The tender offer may commence during
this period, but shares tendered may not be purchased until the expiration of the 15-day period.
Id at 333, 334, 341, 345-62. For this reason, the 15-day waiting period created by the antitrust
laws is not a "waiting period" in the same sense as the state takeover law waiting periods.
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contained in the laws is the friendly offer exemption.2 32 Such an exemption
normally provides that if the target company's board of directors approves
the offer, the tender offer law will not apply. Some states exempt companies
with securities not registered pursuant to section 12 of the 1934 Act. 233 A
few states exempt tender offers made pursuant to a registration statement
filed with the SEC.
234
One of the more obvious drawbacks of the state tender offer laws is the
imprecise jurisdictional limits. It will be unclear where a corporation's prin-
cipal place of business is or whether it has substantial assets in a state. Spe-
cifically, it is unclear whether the latter requires the corporation to have a
substantial amount of assets in the state or a substantial portion (more than ten
percent, twenty-five percent or fifty percent) in the state.23 5 The problem
which could result from these vague jurisdictional limits is that a tender offer
could be governed by two or more statutes.
236
The state tender offer laws currently have a number of conflicting re-
quirements. For example, the laws of some states prohibit a tender offer from
remaining effective more than thirty-five days,237 while other states require a
tender offer to remain effective for more than thirty-five days. 238 Most states
232. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.57.010(3) (Supp. 1979); see generall, Tender Offers, supra
note 113, at 209; Comment, supra note 220, at 405.
233. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-102(5)(c) (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 517.351(5)(c) (Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3770(2)(e) (1973).
234. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3770(2)(b) (1973).
235. The Indiana takeover law only applies to foreign corporations that have a substantial
portion of their assets in Indiana. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-10) (Burns Supp. 1979). In the
tender offer by United Technologies for shares of Otis Elevator, the Indiana Securities Division
concluded that the fact that Otis had $32,000,000 worth of assets in Indiana (9% of its total
assets) did not constitute a substantial portion of its assets. Vaughan, State Tender 0 er Regula-
tion, 9 REV. SEC. REG. 969, 970 n.15 (1976).
The Ohio law provides that it only governs foreign corporations whose principal place of
business is in Ohio and which have substantial assets in Ohio. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1707.04.1(A)(1) (1978). Societe Imetal made a tender offer for the shares of Cooperweld, a
non-Ohio corporation. Cooperweld's executive offices apparently were in Pennsylvania; it ap-
parently had no assets in Ohio and was not qualified to do business there. Wilner & Landy, The
Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constituttwnahty, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 12 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Wilner & Landy]. Two subsidiaries were Ohio corporations, while five
other subsidiaries were foreign. Id at 12-13. Cooperweld's management contended that, since
its two Ohio subsidiaries conducted a significant amount of its business in Ohio, the principal
place of business of the parent should be deemed Ohio and the parent should be deemed to
have substantial assets in Ohio. The Ohio Attorney General concluded that the Ohio takeover
statute governed Cooperweld. Id. at 13. This obviously represents a rather broad interpretation
of what constitutes substantial assets. The Attorney General believed that if a company has
substantial assets in Ohio, its principal place of business is in Ohio. Id. at 5; see Comment, supra
note 220, at 403 n.76.
236. It was initially believed that the tender offer by Great Western United for Sunshine
Mining would be simultaneously governed by three takeover statutes. See Note, supra note 108,
at 888 n.125.
237. See, e.g., HAWAtI REV. STAT. § 417E-2(I) (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3772(1) (1973);
VA. CODE § 13.1-530(a) (Supp. 1978).
238. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I 10C, § 7 (West Supp. 1979); MICH. COMp. LAWS
§ 451.905(2) (Supp. 1979). Both require the tender offer to be held open 60 days. The Michi-
gan law also provides that if the proposed purchase price is increased (which frequently hap-
pens) at any time during the offer, this is considered a new offer and the offer must remain open
for 60 days after the date the increased price was offered.
The Williams Act has been construed to require an offer to remain open for 10 days. The
New York Stock Exchange Company Manual provides that tender offers "should" remain open
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(and the Williams Act) permit a tender offer to be made for less than all of
the shares of a target company; Hawaii requires that a tender offer be made
for all shares. 239 Moreover, different rules exist regarding the period during
which shareholders may withdraw tendered shares, 240 and the periods dur-
ing which the offeror must purchase tendered shares on a pro rata basis if the
tender is oversubscribed. 24 1 It would be manifestly impossible to satisfy two
different types of pro rata repurchase standards, without purchasing more
shares than desired. Finally, one state regulatory authority may find a
tender offer unfair and either disapprove or postpone the tender offer, while
another state regulatory authority may approve the tender offer.
The different state requirements suggest that it would be highly burden-
some to have one tender offer regulated by more than one law. The admin-
istrative hearing requirements of the various statutes also could place a
significant burden upon tender offers. In the current extraterritorial form of
state tender offer laws, a tender offer cannot be made in any state until all
administrative hearing requirements have been satisfied in all states alleging
jurisdiction. In addition, it could be difficult to agree on terms that all state
securities commissions would deem fair and equitable.
242
These administrative hearings also could create timing problems for the
for a minimum of 10 days. 1 M. LEvrON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS
226 (1978). The American Stock Exchange Company Guide provides that a tender offer must
remain open for a minimum of 14 days. Id. at 227. The various state tender offer laws require
tender offers to remain open for a minimum of between 10 to 60 days. See generall 2 TENDER
OFFERS HANDBOOK (J. Robinson ed. 1977).
239. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-2(3) (1976).
240. See Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 213-14. Some states reflect the Williams Act rule
that tendered shares may be withdrawn during the first seven days the offer is effective, and 60
days after the offer is made if it is still open. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1506(2) (Supp. 1979).
Other states set forth a different rule. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § I 1-51.5-103(l)(c) (Supp. 1978)
(withdrawal permitted during the first 15 days after the offer and 35 days after the offer, if still
open); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (Supp. 1978) (first 20 days after offer); IND. CODE
§ 23-2-3-5(a) (1978) (withdrawal permitted at any time until three days preceding the an-
nounced termination date); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3772(2) (Supp. 1978) (first 21 days after
offer); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-9a (West Supp. 1979-80); VA. CODE 13.1-530(b) (Supp. 1978).
The Williams Act rule is found in 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976).
241. These rules generally provide that if the number of shares tendered exceeds the
number of shares desired by the bidder, shares tendered during a certain period must be
purchased by the offeror on a pro rata basis rather than pursuant to a first tendered, first
purchased procedure. For example, the Williams Act provides that shares tendered during the
first ten days of a tender offer are entitled to pro rata repurchase protection. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(6) (1976). Some states follow this rule while many others do not. For example, a
number of states provide that the pro rata repurchase protection applies to shares tendered at
any time during the tender offer. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-9(b) (Supp. 1979-80); VA.
CODE § 13.1-530(c) (Supp. 1978). Others provide for pro rata repurchase during a longer pe-
riod than that specified in the Williams Act. Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(3) (Supp.
1978) (twenty days).
242. APL Corporation recently proposed to make an exchange offer for the shares of Pabst
Brewing Company. The Wisconsin Securities Commissioner rigorously reviewed the terms of
the offer. The offer was never made; a significant factor in this decision to abandon the offer
was the burden placed upon the offer by the Wisconsin Securities Commission. 1 M. LIPTON &
E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 255 (1978); Pabst Buys Stake Held by Suitor APL,"
Takeover Feud Ends, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1979, at 19, col. I (western edition). Another proposed
tender offer that never commenced because of burdens placed upon the offer by the involve-
ment of the state's securities commission was the proposed offer for the shares of Universal Leaf
Tobacco Company by Congoleum Corporation. After the proposed tender offer had not been
approved by the Virginia Securities Commission eight months after the intention to tender was
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offeror. For example, the laws of certain states provide that a tender offer
must be made during a certain period after the filing of a notice of intention
to make a tender offer. 243 The initiation of a state administrative hearing
could easily make it impossible to satisfy such a time requirement.
A number of commentators have discussed whether a tender offer con-
stitutes a matter pertaining to the internal affairs of a corporation. 244 This
obviously depends upon how the issue is characterized. The internal affairs
of a corporation are normally defined as matters pertaining to the relation-
ships among its directors, officers, and shareholders. Internal affairs are con-
trasted with relationships between the corporation and third parties.
A sale of a corporation's securities is generally not considered an inter-
nal affairs question. If a tender offer is characterized as a sale of control to
an existing shareholder, 245 however, this seems to be an internal affairs mat-
ter, since it is a sale of control and the purchaser already has a relationship
with the corporation. If a tender offer is characterized as just a large securi-
ties transaction, a tender offer seems to resemble the type of transaction
which has traditionally been governed by state blue sky law and not by the
state of incorporation. Certain commentators argue that a tender offer con-
stitutes an internal affairs matter;246 others contend that it is not. 247 This
debate seems to be generating much heat, but little light. The primary issue
is not whether this constitutes a matter pertaining to the internal affairs of a
corporation, but whether tender offers require uniform national regulation
by the law of one state, or whether concurrent regulation by the various
interested states is a workable approach. If it is determined that a tender
offer can be governed by a number of state takeover laws, no more need be
decided; the various interested states could regulate a tender offer. 248 If it is
decided that tender offers require uniform national regulation, then the issue
is what law should be applied to such tender offers.
The extraterritorial aspects of state takeover laws could be deleted and
jurisdiction of state takeover laws could be limited to offers made to residents
of the forum. 249 This would obviously result in one tender offer being regu-
lated by a number of various blue sky laws. As mentioned, the laws as cur-
announced, Congoleum decided not to pursue the tender offer. Congoleum Drops Universal Leaf
Bid, Richmond Times Dispatch, June 10, 1977, at A-1I, col. 1.
243. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (1978).
244. Compare Note, supra note 108, at 931 and Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State
Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 722, 722-23 [hereinafter
cited as Shipman] with Wilner & Landy, supra note 235, at 16 and Note, Commerce Clause Limita-
lion Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1153 (1974).
245. A tender offeror frequently purchases approximately five percent of the shares of the
target company before a tender offer is made. After five percent of the target's shares are
owned, a Schedule 13D must be filed with the SEC and the offeror's interest in the target
becomes public.
246. See Shipman, supra note 244, at 722-23; Note, supra note 108, at 931. Proponents of this
view note that a tender offer is the functional equivalent of a proxy fight, unquestionably an
internal affairs matter.
247. See Wilner & Landy, supra note 235, at 16.
248. Of course, it would still have to be decided whether such laws should be extraterrito-
rial.
249. See generally Note, Commerce Clause Limtation Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1153 (1974).
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rently enacted contain many different and sometimes glaringly
contradictory requirements. Disclosure requirements would vary from state
to state. More importantly, states would apply different substantive rules to
a tender offer involving shareholders residing in more than one state. There-
fore, a significant burden would result from the regulation of tender offers by
all states in which target company shareholders reside.
It has also been suggested that if multi-state regulation of tender offers
would be permitted (without extraterritorial application of the state laws),
offerors would not make offers in states with few shareholders or restrictive
* statutes. 250 Target company shareholders would inevitably receive different
prices for their shares. Such a tender offer regulatory procedure would prob-
ably be chaotic and significantly hinder interstate commerce.
The alternative would be one tender offer law governing the tender of-
fer. This would be a more manageable way to regulate a tender offer. The
law governing such a tender offer could be selected in the same manner as
other internal affairs choice of law determinations discussed above. The
tender offer law to be applied would be the tender offer law, if any, of the
state of incorporation, unless the target company were a pseudo-foreign cor-
poration and the state of commercial domicile had enacted a takeover law
which governed pseudo-foreign corporations so that the statute would only
extend to corporations whose commercial domicile was in the forum.
25'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The application of the internal affairs doctrine has had a "Gresham's
law" effect upon state corporation codes. This has resulted because the doc-
trine has been rigidly applied even regarding those corporations that had
little or no contact with the state of incorporation and had a majority of its
contacts with another state. The enactment of pseudo-foreign corporation
laws, plus statutory choice of law provisions which expressly recognize the
psuedo-foreign corporation limit to the internal affairs doctrine, such as
those discussed in the article could stem this pro-management tide of state
corporation laws. A corporation could no longer evade the corporate law of
its commercial domicile merely by incorporating elsewhere. States would be
able to regulate corporations in the manner considered optimal, rather than
in the manner considered necessary to induce domestic corporations not to
incorporate or reincorporate elsewhere.
If this scheme would curb the pro-management trend in state corporate
law, this would allow states to continue to be responsible for regulating the
internal affairs of corporations. If the pro-management trend in state corpo-
rate law continues, it seems inevitable that increasing pressure will be placed
upon Congress to regulate certain internal affairs matters, and possibly even
preempt state corporate law.
The application of the internal affairs doctrine frequently results in the
250. See Note, supra note 108, at 933.
251. None of the present tender offer statutes which attempt to govern tender offers for the
shares of certain foreign corporations is so limited.
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corporation being regulated by a state with little or no interest in governing
its affairs. The scheme advanced in this article would result in corporations
being regulated by the commercial domicile (the state with the most interest
in regulating the corporation), while retaining certainty in corporate choice
of law.
Tender offers and certain other corporate internal affairs require uni-
form national regulation. Therefore, full faith and credit should generally
require the application of the law of the state of incorporation to such ques-
tions. An exception to this rule seems reasonable if the corporation has a
majority of its contacts with another state, and if that state has adopted a
pseudo-foreign corporation statute regulating that issue. Then, full faith and
credit should be required to be given to the pseudo-foreign corporation law
of that state rather than the law of the state of incorporation. If the state of
commercial domicile has not adopted such a law, full faith and credit should
require the application of the law of the state of incorporation, even if the
corporation is a tramp or technically foreign corporation. Multi-state regu-
lation of other issues which are susceptible to multiple state regulation
should be permitted as long as the regulating state has sufficient contacts
with the corporation to satisfy due process requirements.
Such a standard is obviously not as simple as the internal affairs doc-
trine. It would, however, provide certainty in corporate choice of law and
permit the state with clearly the predominate interest in regulating a corpo-
ration to do so. Multi-state regulation of issues which require uniform na-
tional regulation would be avoided.
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